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ABSTRACT
The challenge of ensuring grid security becomes more complex with the
advancement of new technology and major events causing widespread damage
in the system. Threats of cyber-attacks create permutations of possible
contingencies that may have never been considered in typical operations and
planning. Natural disasters have caused devastating effects, taking out entire
power systems and leaving thousands of customers without service for extended
periods. The integration of more renewables into the grid creates dynamic
stability concerns due to the replacement of large, rotating machines. In these
examples, security can be assessed by studying dynamic stability, while also
considering the consequences of each contingency or modification in the system.
Security has been analyzed in three separate projects using various systems.
The first project is Multi-Timescale Integrated Dynamics and Scheduling for Solar
(MIDAS). In this project, a machine learning tool was used to determine security
criteria for frequency, transient, and small-signal stability of a power system
integrated with renewables. Security assessment is a fundamental function for
both short-term and long-term power system operation. The developed datadriven security assessment (DSA) criteria uses machine learning to determine
when it is necessary to trigger dynamic simulation by linking traditional isolated
dynamic simulation with long-term scheduling. In the second project, a model of
Puerto Rico’s 2018 transmission system was created. Simulations of major
contingencies were performed on the Puerto Rico system, including the trip of
main transmission corridors along the path of destructive Hurricane Maria. In the
future, higher renewable penetration in the Puerto Rico system is expected.
Therefore, studies were run at high solar penetration levels to assess dynamic
stability under these conditions. Lastly, a cybersecurity study of a large system
was also performed. Several scenarios were analyzed to determine stability
boundaries and effects of possible targeted attacks. The goal was to determine
critical contingencies that would cause system collapse.
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1
INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL INFORMATION
A task force set up jointly between International Council on Large Electric Systems
(CIGRE) and Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) defines power
system security as the degree of risk in the system’s ability to survive imminent
disturbances without interruption of customer service, which depends on the
system operating condition as well as the contingent probability of disturbances
[1]. This task force defines stability of a power system as the continuance of intact
operation following a disturbance [1]. Security is distinguished from stability in
terms of contingency effects, in that two systems can have identical stability
margins but vary in security due to instability consequences [1]. In order for a
system to be reliable, it must be secure most of the time. The pyramid in Figure
1.1 illustrates how a system must be stable to be secure and secure to be reliable.
Stability analysis is an essential part of dynamic security assessment. Along with
determining whether or not a system will be stable after a given disturbance, the
probability and consequences of instability should be considered, which
incorporates security assessment. This thesis covers research performed on three
projects that involve dynamic security assessments through stability analysis using
various approaches.

Dynamic Security Assessment (DSA) for Multi-Timescale
Integrated Dynamics and Scheduling for Solar (MIDAS)
Multi-Timescale Integrated Dynamics and Scheduling for Solar (MIDAS) is part of
the Department of Energy (DOE) Solar Energy Technologies Office (SETO)
program, which focuses on addressing the affordability, flexibility, and
performance of solar technologies on the grid. Members of the MIDAS team are
from NREL (National Renewable Energy Laboratory), Electric Power Research
Institute (EPRI), Southern Methodist University (SMU), California Independent
Service Organization (CAISO), Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT),
and the University of Tennessee, Knoxville (UTK).
The goal of MIDAS is to simulate the interaction between market scheduling and
dynamic responses. This is done by developing temporally comprehensive,
closed-loop simulation models that seamlessly simulate solar photovoltaic (PV)
variability and its impact on power systems operations from economic scheduling
timescales (day-ahead to hours) to dynamic response analysis (seconds to subseconds). A quasi-dynamic method integrates short-term dynamics, mid-term
scheduling, and long-term unit commitment into a single simulation framework to
realize the multi-timescale simulation.
1

Figure 1.1. Pyramid showing relationship of definitions between stability, security, and reliability
definitions from [1]
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To assist the quasi-dynamic simulation framework, data-driven security
assessment (DSA) criteria was used to significantly reduce the computational
burden. The DSA criteria provides a key indicator to switch the simulation
method by determining when it is necessary to trigger dynamic simulation. The
DSA uses machine learning to decide when and to what extent to activate the
dynamic model during simulation, using dispatch scheduling data as input. The
stability margins associated with the dynamic security assessment include smallsignal stability, frequency stability, and transient stability. As part of the DSA
team, UTK was tasked with determining the data-driven-based security
assessment criteria using model integration.
The concept of this framework presented in Figure 1.2. As presented in this
diagram, a trigger, or the data-driven-based security assessment, integrates
power scheduling data with power system dynamics. When incorporating solar
into the system generation, PV and inverter models become a part of power
system dynamics, and solar scheduling is included in the system scheduling
model.

Assessing Security During Natural Disasters and Increased
Renewable Penetration in Puerto Rico
In fall 2017, Hurricane Maria became the largest blackout in U.S. history, by
customer-hours of lost electricity service [3]. Electricity was cut off to 100% of the
island, with many households going at least 84 days without power [4]. A year
after the storm, all customers were finally restored. Hurricane Maria also caused
as much as $94.4 billion in damages and a death toll of almost 3,000 people [4].
The path of Hurricane Maria, along with main transmission and generation assets
of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) system, is presented in
Figure 1.3. According to 2019 census data, about 40% Puerto Rico’s population
lives in the metropolitan area of San Juan in the northeast corner of the territory
[5]. The transmission lines carrying electricity from south to north, shown in
Figure 1.3, are vulnerable since the majority of generation capacity is in the
south. Although 847 transmission structures fell during the hurricane, the
complete outage was a result of two main 230kV lines failing after a fire at a
circuit breaker at the Aguirre plant [5]. Several plants and distribution lines were
also destroyed due to flooding and strong winds.
After the hurricane, DOE wanted to further analyze Puerto Rico’s grid. DOE’s
Office of Electricity asked the national laboratories to perform near-term modeling
activities for Puerto Rico. The request was part of the federal effort to support the
rebuilding of a more resilient and secure electric power grid system after
devastation caused by Hurricane Maria.
3

Figure 1.2. Diagram of the quasi-dynamic multiple timescales power system simulation
framework [2]

Figure 1.3. Major generation and transmission assets of PREPA system [5]

4

Recommendations to DOE included protection and prevention against future
natural disasters and weather-related events, along with understanding the
effects of increased renewable penetration throughout the system.
Recommendations were developed by creating and analyzing transmission
system models of the PREPA grid. Additionally, sensors were requested to be
placed throughout the Puerto Rico system to provide enhanced situational
awareness and refine developed transmission models by comparing actual
measurements to modeled power flow and dynamic response.

Assessing Security During Cyber-Attacks and Wide-Area
Physical Attacks on Bulk Electric System Assets
The motivation for the cyber-security project was to simulate and evaluate
dynamic effects of a strategic wide-area cyber-attack, electromagnetic pulse
(EMP), or geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) in the U.S power grid and other large
systems. To do this, load flow and dynamic simulations were conducted to
investigate impacts of hackers shutting down multiple substations or generation
facilities within an electric utility.
Critical substations, connecting large generation plants and loads to the system,
were determined as origins of the attacks. For the initial security assessment,
dynamic frequency stability and voltage stability were analyzed following a major
attack. Though the probability of the studied scenarios occurring is small, their
effects were devastating, taking out an entire large system. The purpose of this
project was to submit cyber-attack simulation results for a proposal to DOE. This
proposal would then request additional funding in this cybersecurity research
effort.

5

2
DYNAMIC SECURITY ASSESSMENT (DSA) FOR MULTITIMESCALE INTEGRATED DYNAMICS AND SCHEDULING
FOR SOLAR (MIDAS)
This chapter discusses the creation of cases to train and test a UTK-developed
machine learning tool. Dynamic stability margin was determined using results of
generated test cases, and the machine learning tool was trained to recognize
dynamic frequency, transient, and small-signal instability using power flow data
as input.

Literature Review
The determination of the security assessment margin can be performed using
model-based methods (e.g. full simulations) or data-driven methods. Full
simulations rely on dynamic models and simulations to assess stability. In
contrast, data-driven methods use datasets to train machine learning models to
classify stable and unstable cases. The following review of existing methods for
data-driven security assessment was part of a collaborative literature review with
Dr. Shutang You and Dr. Yi Cui on the UTK team:
Existing methods for data-driven security assessment primarily focus on transient
stability. Transient stability is concerned with the ability of the power system to
maintain synchronism when subjected to a severe disturbance, such as a short
circuit on a transmission line [1]. The existing literature that applies machine
learning to determine transient stability mainly uses three categories of methods:
support vector machine (SVM), neural network (NN), and decision tree (DT).
Most of these studies used the New England 10-machine system as the test
system. These methods have reached high accuracy in classifying stable and
unstable cases.
Table 2.1 to Table 2.4 summarize the machine learning model, along with the
power system model used in previous studies. The number of total samples, or
waveforms, analyzed by the model are listed. A portion of these samples were
used for training and the others for testing. The number of features refers to the
number of parameters serving as input to the machine learning tool, such as
individual voltage, angle, or frequency measurements. The percent accuracy
identifies how results computed during testing compare with actual solutions.
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Table 2.1. Support vector machine (SVM) based method for transient stability assessment
Ref

Model

[6]

SVM + transient
energy function
(TEF)

[7]

Ball vector
machine (BVM)

[8]

SVM

[8]

SVM + DT +
rotor angles
trajectory
clustering

[9]

[10]

[12]

[13]

[14]

SVM, Naïve
Bayes, decision
tree
SVM + Costsensitive
ensemble
learning classifier
Least Square
Support Vector
Machine (LSSVM)
Reformed
support vector
machines +
sequential
minimal
optimization
(SMO)
Fuzzy C-means
clustering
algorithm + SVM

Test
System
New
England
10machine
New
England
10machine
Priba
system :
2484
buses
New
England
10machine
and IEEE
145-bus

Samples

Training

Testing

#
Features

Accuracy
(%)

700

500

200

36, 18

97.5 –
100

5500

4000

1500

200

97.1

1242

994

248

224,
150,
100, 50

94.4

3672

1099

2573

19

90.74 –
98.15
94.75 –
95.41

8000

N/A

N/A

23

88.2 –
98.8

4290

4000

290

23

96.4 –
99.4

6600

4620

1980

39

100

New
England
10machine

20000

16000

4000

15

96.9

IEEE 39bus
system

726

556

170

10

100

IEEE 14bus
New
England
10machine
New
England
10machine
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Table 2.2. Neural network (NN) based methods for transient stability assessment
Ref

[15]

[16]

[17]

[18]

[19]

[20]

[21]

Model
Extreme
learning
machines
(ELM)
Extreme
learning
machine
(ELM) +
trajectory
fitting (TF)
Extreme
learning
machine
(ELM) + a
decisionmaking
process
An array of
neural
networks
(NN) + an
interpreter
Probabilistic
neural
network
(PNN)
Recurrent
neural
network
(RNN) +
long shortterm
memory
network
(LSTM)
Long-short
Term
Memory
(LSTM)
ensemble
neural
network +
decision
machine

Test
System

Samples

Training

Testing

#
Features

Accuracy
(%)

IEEE 50bus system

6345

5076

1269

50

100

New
England 10machine

10000

N/A

N/A

100 (269)

99.1

New
England 10machine

4000

2000

2000

N/A

97.92 –
98.38

248/300

208/250

40/50

N/A

99.85/100

190
operation
condition
s and
threephase
faults

N/A

N/A

244,
150,100,5
0

> 99

New
England 10machine

5000

3750

1250

N/A

100

New
England 10machine

4058

3044

1014

N/A

100

PSB4
system +
New
England 10machine
IEEE 68bus, 16generator
system +
three wind
generation
units
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Table 2.2. Continued
Ref

[22]

[23]

[24]

[25]

Model
Extreme
learning
machine(EL
M) +
Boosting
learning
Extreme
learning
machine(EL
M)
Convolution
al neural
network
(CNN) +
stacked
autoencoders
(SAEs)
Neural
network
(NN) +
incremental
learning

Test
System

Samples

Training

Testing

#
Features

Accuracy
(%)

New
England 10machine

68640

N/A

N/A

50 (183)

100

New
England 10machine

1240

864

376

62

98

New
England 10machine

4014

2689

1325

22

96.78 –
98.68

Shandong
power
system- 362
buses

945

540

405

N/A

96.6
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Table 2.3. Decision tree (DT) based methods for transient stability assessment
Ref

[26]

[27]
[28]

[29]

Model

Test System

Samples

Training

Testing

#
Features

Accuracy
(%)

Decision tree
(DT) +
regression
tree (RT)
Weighted
random forest
(WRF)
Random
forest (RF)

Salt River
Project
(SRP) power
system

41412

33130

8282

N/A

99.13

New England
10-machine

2000

1300

700

263

98.79

2000

1300

700

45

99.1

5

79.92 –
100
94.91 –
99.91

Decision tree
(DT)

New England
10-machine
9-bus
dynamic
network and
1696-bus
Iran national
grid

513/1080

N/A

N/A

Table 2.4. Other methods for transient stability assessment
Ref

[30]

[31]

[32]

Model

Test System

Samples

Training

Testing

#
Features

Accuracy
(%)

Deep belief
network
(DBN)

A real regional
power system
in China,
consisting of
1300 buses,
3215
transmission
lines

10000

8330

1670

1762

98.02

A practical
470-bus
system

1199

800

399

939

99.75

New England
10-machine

2000

1500

500

56

97.51 –
98.31

Least
Absolute
Selection
and
Shrinkage
Operator
(LASSO)
Type-2
fuzzy
neural
network
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Existing machine-learning methods for data-driven security assessment primarily
focus on transient stability. Very few studies have investigated frequency and
small-signal stability assessment using machine-learning approaches. The
studies found for frequency and small-signal stability are included in Table 2.5
and Table 2.6.
According to the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and
International Council on Large Electric Systems (CIGRE) definition, frequency
stability refers to the ability of a power system to maintain steady frequency
following a severe system upset resulting in a significant imbalance between
generation and load [1]. Instability that may result occurs in the form of sustained
frequency swings leading to tripping of generating units and/or loads [1]. Very
few studies have investigated frequency stability assessment using a data–driven
approach. In [29], an artificial neural network (ANN) was used to predict the
frequency stability using power flow information. However, this study does not
consider the headroom reserve of each generator, which can increase the error
of the model.
Small-disturbance (or small-signal) rotor angle stability is concerned with the
ability of the power system to maintain synchronism under small disturbances.
The disturbances are considered to be sufficiently small. Linearization of a
system of equations is permissible for the purpose of analysis [1]. Reference [34]
studied the small-signal stability of a single machine infinite bus system under
different power and power factor conditions, as well as power system stabilizer
settings. Reference [35] used a decision tree to predict the eigenvalue region of
critical modes.
Comparing the accuracy of common machine learning methods, neural network
models tend to have the highest accuracy, followed by decision tree models and
support vector machine models, as shown in Figure 2.1. Although not used as
frequently, the random forest method also has high accuracy. Therefore, the
neural network and random forest models were selected for the machine-learning
tool. Only the random forest model has been implemented in the tool, but the
neural network model will later be integrated as well.
Though previous studies have used machine learning to predict stability, there
are a few characteristics that make this model novel. Previous studies used
specific power flow solution parameters as input to a machine learning tool, such
as voltage and angle at particular buses, power flow of individual branches, along
with individual machine and load data. Since the developed quasi-dynamic model
is supposed to integrate long-term scheduling with short-term dynamics, only
scheduling data, or generator dispatch, is used as an input into the tool.
Additionally, other previously developed tools do not use models with high PV
levels. The variability of PV makes long-term scheduling more complex.
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Table 2.5. Data-driven frequency stability assessment
Ref

Model

[33]

Singlehidden layer
feedforward
network
(SLFN)

Test
System
IEEE 14Bus
System;
New
England
39-bus
system

Samples

Training

Testing

#
Features

Accuracy
(%)

600

480

120

N/A

97.5%

Table 2.6. Data-driven small-signal stability assessment

Ref

Model

[34]

Artificial
neural
network

[35]

Decision
tree

Test System
Single
machine
infinite bus
system
PST 16machine test
system

Samples

Training

Testing

#
Features

Accuracy
(%)

N/A

N/A

N/A

4

~90%

2500

N/A

N/A

252

99.77%

Figure 2.1. Accuracy comparison of machine learning methods
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The machine learning tool created in the DSA project is designed to accurately
assess the dynamic stability margin in cases with large amounts of solar
generation. Lastly, each of the past studies mentioned only analyze a single
stability issue, most often transient stability. This tool analyzes three stability
issues: frequency, transient, and small-signal.

Machine-Learning Based Stability Analysis to Determine
DSA Criteria
A machine learning tool, created by Dr. Yi Cui in MATLAB, was used to
determine DSA criteria. The machine learning steps include database or data file
extraction, training, classification, and testing. First, the tool extracts feature data
from a database of real-time data points, directly from PSS®E dynamic
simulation output files (.out) files, or from other power system simulation software
files. Before the tool can classify whether or not a case is stable, it is trained by
sets of stable and unstable cases. The tool then learns what criteria must be set
based upon feature values from these cases.
Stability of a system was determined by assessing frequency stability, transient
stability, and small-signal stability. For each stability problem, neural network
based methods were to be used to develop the data-driven approach for security
assessment. To train and test the machine learning tool, a number of steadystate cases were produced in PSS®E, each with varying generation dispatch.
After steady-state cases were created, dynamic simulations were performed on
each steady-state case and corresponding dynamic file, with the contingency and
monitored parameters dependent upon the stability problem assessed. From
dynamic simulation results, criteria for the security assessment was derived.
Criteria was verified by inputting only generation dispatch results into the
machine learning tool. The tool then determined whether or not the stability
margin was met. These results were confirmed using other cases of simulated
results. The data-driven assessment approaches developed for each stability
type are summarized in Table 2.7.
2.1.1 Creation of Steady-State Cases: The 23-Bus System Example
The first set of steady-state cases were generated using a 23-bus system. The
23-bus system was provided as an example case with the installation of PSS®E
33. A diagram of the system is shown in Figure 2.2 was generated from the
savnw.sld file provided by PSS®E. There are three main areas of the system,
with Area 1 in the middle and Areas 2 and 5 on each side of Area 1. The total
generation capacity of the system is 4,153.25 MW.
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Table 2.7. Overview of security assessment approaches for frequency, transient, and small-signal
stability

Stability
Type

Frequency

Transient

SmallSignal

Machine Learning Training
Feature
Contingency
Monitored

Generation
trip

Three-phase
fault on
transmission
line

Linearization,
small
disturbance

System
frequency

Machine rotor
angle

Mode
frequency
and damping
ratio
computed by
eigenvalue
analysis

Machine Learning Testing
Input

Generation
dispatch
results

Generation
dispatch
results

Generation
dispatch
results
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Output

Frequency
nadir to
determine
frequency
stability
margin

Transient
stability
margin

Smallsignal
stability
margin

Assessment
Approach
Generate a batch
of cases with
different dispatch
and inertia levels.
Evaluate
frequency
response using
dynamic
simulation.

Generate a batch
of cases with
different dispatch
and unit
commitment.
Evaluate transient
stability using
standard TPL001-4 and
dynamic
simulation.

Generate a batch
of cases with
different dispatch
and unit
commitment.
Evaluate smallsignal stability
using small-signal
analysis and
dynamic
simulation.

Figure 2.2. Diagram of 23-bus system
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Each area of the system was assigned a different load curve, based on
geographic diversity, as indicated in Figure 4.3. Load data was taken from three
balancing authorities in the Western Interconnection, each at varying longitudes:
Alberta Electric System Operator (AESO), PacifiCorp West (PACW), and Tucson
Electric Power Authority (TEPC). Load data was predicted every hour over a
period of 13 months, from 1/1/2020 0:00 to 1/31/2021 0:00. The 23-bus system
load was adjusted by taking the total load of each area and scaling it by the
percent deviation of the corresponding balancing authority’s load data at each
time. Comparisons of the 23-bus system areas’ total loads and the balancing
authorities’ total loads over time are shown in Figure 2.4 to Figure 2.9.
An automated scheduling process was used to assign machine maintenance.
Generator maintenance was scheduled during low-load periods. This process
considered the system total load curve, machines currently offline or previously
scheduled to be offline, along with each machine’s capacity. Machine outages
were scheduled in order from largest to smallest capacity. After each machine’s
maintenance was scheduled, an equivalent total system load curve was updated
so the algorithm could account for previously scheduled service periods. Once a
machine was taken out-of-service, the machine had an out-of-service duration of
four weeks.
Transmission lines were also taken out of service depending on the probability of
an outage occurring. Line outage probability was determined using the system’s
Reliability Outage Statistics Data file (.prb) in PSS®E. This file contains
information, such as the branch reactance per mile, branch charging
susceptance per mile, outage frequency for terminal caused single circuit
outages, outage duration for terminal caused single circuit outages, outage
frequency for single circuit outages per mile, and outage duration for single circuit
outages. To calculate frequency and duration of each branch’s outage over 13month period, the following computations in (1) were implemented.

xm = branch reactance per mile
bm = branch charging susceptance per mile
ft = outage frequency for terminal caused single circuit outages
dt = outage duration for terminal caused single circuit outages
fmt = outage frequency for single circuit outages per mile
dmt = outage duration for single circuit outages
len = branch x/xm (miles)
F = len*fmt+ft
D = (fmt*dmt*len+ft*dt)/F
Failure Time = F*D/9528
*9528 = total number of hours from 1/1/2020 to 1/31/2021
16

(1)

Figure 2.3. Map of selected balancing authorities and corresponding areas of 23-bus system [36]
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Figure 2.4. Total load curve for PACW

Figure 2.5. Total load curve for Area 1 of 23-bus system
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Figure 2.6. Total load curve for AESO

Figure 2.7. Total load curve for Area 2 of the 23-bus system
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Figure 2.8. Total load curve for TEP

Figure 2.9. Total load curve for Area 5 of the 23-bus system

20

The results of a random number generator, with uniform distribution, determined
whether or not a transmission line was out of service or not at each hour.
Because transmission line outages were scheduled based on chance, the
probability of a transmission line being out at a given hour was not dependent
upon if the line had been previously scheduled to be out-of-service. Examples of
events causing these types of outages include inclement weather, operator error,
or other physical disturbances. An outage duration of 10 hours was set for each
line out-of-service. The Python script used to generate saved cases for the 23bus system is included in the Appendix in Section A.1.1.
2.1.2 Creation of Steady-State Cases: The 18-Bus System
The 18-bus system was provided by NREL and was originally converted from
PSLF software to PSS®E. Similar to the 23-bus system, the 18-bus system has
three areas. It was determined to use the 18-bus system instead of the 23-bus
system because there is loop flow between four areas, where each area is
directly connected to at least two other areas. In the 23-bus system, only Area 1
is connected to each of the other two areas. A diagram of the 18-bus system can
be found in Figure 2.10. In the 18-bus system, there are 6 machines, with a
system total capacity of 4,270 MW, 18 branches, 7 transformers, and 8 loads
totaling 2,130 MW in the base case.
NREL provided load and generation data for the 18-bus system over a 24-hour
period. Although individual load and machine data was given for every 4 seconds
of the 24-hour period, saved cases were only generated for every 5 minutes.
Therefore, 288 PSS®E saved cases were created. The developed saved cases
were used in frequency, transient, and small-signal analysis. A Python script
extracted generation and load data from input comma-separated values (CSV)
files, scaled each machine’s and load’s real power, and saved the results in
individual PSS®E saved case files for each 5-minute period. The Python script
used to generate saved cases for the 18-bus system is included in the Appendix
in Section A.1.2.1.
2.1.3 Data-Driven Frequency Stability Margin Prediction
To predict the frequency stability margin, the same contingency, a generation
trip, was run on each file in the batch of generated steady-state cases. Since the
steady-state cases had various levels of generation dispatch, inertia levels were
modified in the PSS®E dynamic files accordingly, depending on total generation
output. The contingency was selected by tripping the maximum amount of
generation the system could handle, while still converging. After each dynamic
simulation was run, the frequency response was evaluated.
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Figure 2.10. Diagram of the 18-bus system provided by NREL
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A curve of the 18-bus system's total generation is shown in Figure 2.11. The
inertia level was forced to be a percentage of the base inertia depending on total
generation output. The purpose of adjusting the inertia at each generation level
was to create a sufficient number of stable and unstable cases to train and test
the machine learning tool. Though the total generation output over the 24-hour
period did not change enough to alter unit commitment and dispatch by large
amounts, the inertia was forced to change linearly, even with a smaller range of
generation output variation. A linear function was created to correlate generator
output and inertia level. The percentages ranged from 20% to 100% of the base
inertia, corresponding to the minimum and maximum total generation output.
Another Python script was written to extract total generation at each time period
from a file, scale each machine’s inertia parameter based on the total generation
value, and save the results to individual PSS®E dynamic files. A curve of the
total inertia level at each time step, given as a percentage of the base case
inertia, is shown in Figure 2.12. The Python script used to create the set of
dynamic files is in the Appendix in Section A.1.2.2.
PSS®E simulations were run on each set of saved cases and dynamic cases.
While tripping 70 MW of generation on each case, the speed deviations of all
machines were monitored. To trip exactly 70 MW, machine West G1 was split
into two machines, with one machine having a constant output of 70 MW and the
other machine’s output adjusting according to changes in dispatch. Using
MATLAB, the speed deviations were converted to frequency, and the minimum
frequency nadirs of all machines for each case were computed and graphed. As
expected, the frequency nadir follows the pattern of both the inertia and
generation curves, indicated by Figure 2.13. The Python script used to simulate
the generation trip on each set of saved cases and dynamic cases is in the
Appendix in Section A.1.2.3.
For machine learning model development, or training and testing the model,
stability was determined by examining the frequency nadir of each simulation
output. Real power dispatch of all generators was provided as input to the
machine learning tool. The frequency nadir of each generator was estimated,
subjected to the generation trip. Among 288 generated cases, 70% of cases
were randomly selected for training, and the remaining cases were used for
testing.
The capability of the machine learning model in predicting the frequency stability
margin was then validated by using the power flow solution. During testing, the
input to the machine learning tool was the real power output of all machines. The
output was frequency stability margin prediction, based on estimated frequency
nadir. The distribution of frequency nadir estimation errors was plotted for each
generator. As seen in Figure 2.14, the estimation error of frequency nadir of
generators is less than 20 mHz.
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Figure 2.11. Total system generation curve for 18-bus system over 24-hour period
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Figure 2.12. Inertia level of machines as a percent of the base inertia over 24-hour period
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Figure 2.13. Minimum frequency nadir of all machines (with forced inertia change) over 24-hour
period

Figure 2.14. Estimation error of frequency nadir of generators
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2.1.4 Data-Driven Transient Stability Margin Prediction
To predict the transient stability margin, a three-phase fault on transmission line,
was introduced in the system. Although the location of the fault was fixed during
all simulations, fault clearing time was varied. In this example, the fault was on
the branch between North-01 (Bus 1) and North-02 (Bus 2) in the 18-bus system.
The same set of fault clearing times were tested at each time step, or every 5
minutes of the 24-hour data period. At each 5-minute time step, fault clearing
time was adjusted from 60 ms-720 ms in intervals of 20 ms. Therefore, 9,792
total test cases were created. Critical clearing time (CCT) was selected as the
metric of transient stability. CCT is defined as the maximum time allowed to
remove the disturbance without interrupting the system's performance. The
system will be stable if the disturbance can be cleared before the time allowed.
The purpose of adjusting the fault clearing time in small intervals was to create a
sufficient number of stable and unstable cases to determine a more exact critical
clearing time. During each simulation, rotor angles of all machines were
monitored. If the rotor angle deviation of any two generators exceeded 180
degrees, the case was considered unstable. The Python script used to simulate
the three-phase fault on the set of saved cases for different clearing times is in
the Appendix in Section A.1.2.4.
The critical clearing time at each dispatch level, or five minutes of data, was
determined by finding the maximum clearing time where the system still
converged at each time step. In general, total system generation and fault critical
clearing time had an inverse relationship. The system was considered more
stable during time steps when the fault required a higher critical clearing time and
less stable when it had a lower critical clearing time. Therefore, greater transient
stability was observed at lower system generation levels. A graph is provided in
Figure 2.15 that shows the relationship of total system generation over time to
critical clearing time of a three-phase fault at a given location.
The capability of the machine learning model in predicting the transient stability
margin was then validated by using the power flow solution. The input to the
machine learning tool was individual real power output of all generators. During
testing, the output was transient stability margin prediction by computing
estimated fault clearing time as a function of dispatch. Similar to frequency
stability assessment, 200 power flow cases were randomly selected for training
and 88 for testing. Figure 2.16 compares the simulated critical clearing time and
estimated critical clearing time from test results of the machine learning tool. As
seen in Figure 2.17, estimation error of critical clearing time is below 25 ms.
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Figure 2.15. Correlation between critical clearing time and total power generation over 24 hours

Figure 2.16. Modelled and estimated critical clearing time in testing dataset
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Figure 2.17. Critical clearing time estimation error distribution
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2.1.5 Data-Driven Small-Signal Stability Margin Prediction
Cases for training and testing the tool for small-signal stability margin prediction
were created using a software called Small-Signal Analysis Tool (SSAT). SSAT
is a part of the DSATools software package, which also includes software for
power flow and short circuit, transient, and voltage security. SSAT has several
small-signal computation methods including eigenvalue analysis, computation of
modes, small-signal stability index, small-signal stability limit search, time and
frequency response calculations, and others.
SSAT can accept system power flow and dynamic information in PTI PSS®E
format, GE PSLF format, and BPA format. Because power flow files had already
been generated in PSS®E, these files were input into SSAT to create a case for
each dispatch level. Each SSAT case accepts a single PSS®E power flow file in
RAW format, along with a single dynamic (.dyr) file. Because 288 power flow files
were generated, every five minutes over a 24-hour period, 288 SSAT cases were
also created. The same dynamic file was used as input for all 288 SSAT cases.
Because SSAT does not have an application programming interface (API) to
easily create a batch of dynamic cases, a MATLAB script was used to change
the filename of the PSS®E RAW file to be input, since SSAT cases can also be
read with a text editor.
After SSAT cases were created for each dispatch level, a small-signal stability
computation was run on each case. The selected computation was full
eigenvalue analysis. Eigenvalues were derived from the state matrix, which
determines the time domain response of the system to small perturbations [37].
Damping ratio was used to decide which of the eigenvalues had the greatest
influence on small-signal stability [37]. The damping ratio is defined by (2).
𝜁𝑖 =

−𝛼𝑖
2

(2)[37]
2

√𝛼𝑖 + 𝜔𝑖
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑎 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑠 𝜁𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑗𝜔𝑖
All modes, with corresponding frequencies and damping ratios, were outputted
for each SSAT case. SSAT has a tool called Case Scheduler to run batch
simulations. A list of SSAT cases were loaded into the Case Scheduler and run
at once. After full eigenvalue analysis was computed, 47 oscillation modes were
found in the 18-bus system at each generation level. Three of the modes had low
damping ratio (below 10%), and other modes had high damping ratio (above
18%). Results from the modes with the smallest three damping ratios were
incorporated into the machine learning tool. Participation factor is defined as the
relative contribution of each state variable to a particular mode [37]. The
participation factor of each generator in the system is presented for each of the
modes. Factors range from 0.0-1.0, where 1.0 means the generator is fully
participating and 0.0 indicates the generator is not participating. Additionally, a
29

comparison of the modeled vs. estimated results from the machine learning tool
is shown, along with the estimation error. To train and test the model, a specific
mode was selected at a time. For training, the damping ratio and generator
dispatch at each 5-minute interval were provided as input to the model, with 200
of the 288 cases randomly selected to train. The rest of the cases were used to
test the accuracy of the model, with only generator dispatch as input and
damping ratio as output. Stability criteria was determined as a negative damping
ratio being unstable and a positive damping ratio being stable.
Mode 1 had the smallest damping ratio. The frequency was 0.73 Hz, and the
damping ratio was 1.11%. According to Table 2.8, West G1 and East G1 are
primarily involved in this mode. Mode 2 had a frequency of 1.06 Hz and a
damping ratio of 5.83% with all generators involved in the mode, exhibited in
Table 2.9. Mode 3 had a frequency of 1.20 Hz and a damping ratio of 6.32%.
Generator South G1 was involved most in this mode, as presented in Table 2.10.
As seen in Figure 2.18 through Figure 2.23, machine learning estimated results
agree well with the generated simulations. Additionally, the change in damping
ratio for each of the three selected modes over the 24-hour period is presented in
Table 2.11. Each individual generator’s real power output and the system total
real power output are also provided in Table 2.11. In general, the higher the
participation factor of an individual machine for a particular mode, the more the
change in damping ratio follows the change in the machine’s real power output.
For example, West G1 and East G1 were most involved in Mode 1. It can be
seen in Table 2.11 that the change in damping ratio for this mode most closely
follows the generation dispatch of West G1 and East G1.

Summary
As stated in UTK’s task for the MIDAS project, the goal was to determine the
data-driven-based security assessment criteria using model integration. This task
was completed by developing cases, based on the NREL-provided 18-bus
system, for training and testing a machine-learning algorithm. Security
assessment criteria was determined for frequency, transient, and small-signal
stability. Stability conditions were set based upon typical definitions for each of
the stability approaches and the output parameters selected for each simulation.
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Table 2.8. Participation factor of generators in Mode 1

Generator
West G1
East G1
South G1
North G1 H1
North G2 H2

Participation Factor
1.00
0.60
0.09
0.01
0.01

Figure 2.18. Mode 1 modeled vs. estimated damping ratio over 24-hour period

Figure 2.19. Mode 1 damping ratio estimation error distribution
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Table 2.9. Participation factor of generators in Mode 2

Generator
North G1 H1
North G2 H2
East G1
West G1
South G1

Participation Factor
1.00
0.88
0.63
0.41
0.26

Figure 2.20. Mode 2 modeled vs. estimated damping ratio over 24-hour period

Figure 2.21. Mode 2 damping ratio estimation error distribution
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Table 2.10. Participation factor of generators in Mode 3

Generator
South G1
North G1 H1
North G2 H2
East G1
West G1

Participation Factor
1.00
0.16
0.14
0.13
0.01

Figure 2.22. Mode 3 modeled vs. estimated damping ratio over 24-hour period

Figure 2.23. Mode 3 damping ratio estimation error distribution
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Table 2.11. Damping ratio change of three selected modes compared to individual and total generator output
MODE 1

MODE 3

Damping
Ratio
Change

Generator
Real
Power
Change
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MODE 2

3 ASSESSING SECURITY DURING NATURAL DISASTERS AND
INCREASED RENEWABLE PENETRATION IN PUERTO RICO
This section covers the development of the 2018 model of the PREPA
transmission system for the purpose of analyzing the current system’s
vulnerabilities. Once the 2018 system was developed, several dynamic
simulations were performed on the model. After the 2018 system model was
created and analyzed, additional models were provided by DOE, including likely
modifications to be made to the system. The model selected for study was a daypeak case for the year 2022. Since actual machine parameters were provided in
the 2022 model, more system detail was available for study. The effects of
increased solar penetration were studied on the 2022 model.

Development of the 2018 Puerto Rico Power Transmission
System Study Model
This system is based off of PREPA’s transmission system on the main island in
2018, shown in Figure 3.1. Buses were named according to their geographic
locations, with each bus representing a substation and voltage level. The two
voltage levels in the PSS®E model are 230kV and 115kV. A summary of the
system is shown in Table 3.1.
3.1.1 The Power Flow Model of the Puerto Rico Power Transmission
System
3.1.1.1 Generation
The generation plants in Table 3.2 were modeled based upon information
provided by PREPA [38]. Each plant was modeled as a separate machine with
the maximum real power output (PMax) set as each plant’s nameplate capacity 1.
For power dispatch for the base case scenario, the real power output (Pout) for
each generator was set as 75% of the PMax. In addition, reactive power limits:
QMax and QMin, were adjusted individually for each generator according to the
PMax and base MVA.

1

A more detailed explanation on capacity modeling is provided in the Appendix in Section A.2.
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Figure 3.1. PREPA's 2018 transmission system [38]
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Table 3.1. PREPA transmission system study model overview

Total
115kV
Buses

Total
230kV
Buses

Total 115kV
Branches

Total 230kV
Branches

72

13

104

18

Total
Generation
Capacity
(MW)
6026.4

Total Load
(MW)
3265

Table 3.2. Generator types and capacities

Generator
Bus
Number
4
9
10
11
15
30
31
39
40
43
47
47
48
48
49
58
58
59
61
68
69
69
69
81
83
85
86
87
88
89

Generator Bus Name

Type

Capacity (MW)

MAYAGUEZ PLA115.00
PONCE
115.00
DOS BOCAS 115.00
CAONILLAS 115.00
VEGA BAJA 115.00
PUNTA LIMA 115.00
RIO BLANCO 115.00
JOBOS
115.00
SANTA ISABEL115.00
TORO NEGRO 115.00
PALO SECO 115.00
PALO SECO 115.00
SAN JUAN 115.00
SAN JUAN 115.00
AES IIUMINA 115.00
COSTA SUR P 115.00
COSTA SUR P 115.00
ECOELCTRICA 115.00
CAMB PLANT 115.00
AES PLANT 115.00
AGUIRRE P 115.00
AGUIRRE P 115.00
AGUIRRE P 115.00
YABUCOA PLAN115.00
SALINA SOLAR115.00
ORIANA SOLAR115.00
SAN FERMIN S115.00
YAUCO
115.00
GARZAS
115.00
DAGUAO
115.00

Gas
Solar
Hydro
Hydro
Gas
Wind
Hydro
Gas
Wind
Hydro
Steam
Gas
Combined Cycle
Steam
Solar
Steam
Gas
Gas
Gas
Gas
Steam
Gas
Combined Cycle
Gas
Solar
Solar
Solar
Hydro
Hydro
Gas

220
2.1
10
21.5
42
26
5
42
75
10.56
602
126
440
400
20
990
42
507
248
454
900
42
592
42
16
45
27
25
12.24
42
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3.1.1.2 Transmission
A map of the Puerto Rico 2018 transmission system is shown in Figure 3.1.
Transmission line impedances and susceptances were calculated using the
geographic distance of each branch in miles2, with the conversion factors
provided in Table 3.3. To do this, each bus was assigned a global positioning
system (GPS) coordinate in latitude and longitude degrees. The Haversine
formula can be used to calculate the great-circle distance between two points,
with each point being a latitude and longitude coordinate. This formula is defined
by (3).
∆𝜑
∆𝜆
𝑎 = 𝑠𝑖𝑛2 ( ) + 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜑1 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜑2 + 𝑠𝑖𝑛2 ( )
2
2
𝑐 = 2 ∗ 𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑛2(√𝑎, √(1 − 𝑎))
𝑑 = 𝑅∗𝑐
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜑 = 𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒, 𝜆 = 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒, 𝑅 = 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡ℎ′ 𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑘𝑚,
𝑑 = 𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 − 𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑡𝑤𝑜 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠,
𝑎 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠

(3)[41]

The line impedance and susceptance parameters in p.u. per mile were assumed
as values shown in Table 3.3 for each voltage level.
3.1.1.3 Load
Load data was approximated using population data. First, population data was
collected for each area in which a substation was located. Each area’s population
was then divided by the total population to estimate the percentage of total
system load that each bus’s load accounted for. The peak demand of the Puerto
Rico power system was given as 3,265 MW [38]. This peak demand value was
multiplied by the population percentage of each bus to derive each bus’s
individual real power load (Pload) value. It was assumed that the power factor for
each bus is 0.98. The load value for each bus is given in Table 3.4.
3.1.2 The Power Flow Solution
After the power flow model and parameters were prepared, the steady-state
power flow was solved to obtain a converged power flow solution. Using the Full
Newton-Raphson method with a flat start, the convergence information during
each iteration is given in Figure 3.2.

2

Although some branches in the real system are not perfectly linear, the geographic distances
and voltage ratings were used to obtain transmission line parameters as the best estimation
based on available information.
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Table 3.3. Transmission line resistance, reactance, and susceptance in p.u. per mile

Voltage level
115kV
230kV

R
0.00054
0.00017

X
0.0030
0.0016

B
0.00048
0.0035

Table 3.4. Load value for each bus derived from population distribution in Puerto Rico

Bus Number
1
2
3
5
6
7
8
9
10
12
13
14
15
16
19
20
21
23
24
25
26
28
29
30
32
33
35
36

Bus Name
Aguadilla
Añasco
San Sebastian
Acacias
San German
Guanica
Canas
Ponce
Dos Bocas
Hatillo
Cambalache
Barceloneta
Vega Baja
Dorado
Il Tejas
Venzuela
Hato Rey
Berwind
M Pena
Viaducto
Isla Grande
Palmer
Fajardo
Daguao
Humacao
Juncos
Bairoa
Caguas

Total
Population
[42]
60,316
29,281
42,092
54,507
35,254
19,115
34,065
149,028
8,331
42,224
131
25,013
59,172
38,524
46,528
74,490
20,867
3,006
415
6,170
753
1,032
36,499
1,838
58,189
40,609
2,365
134,481

39

% Population
of Total
2.382%
1.157%
1.663%
2.153%
1.393%
0.755%
1.346%
5.887%
0.329%
1.668%
0.005%
0.988%
2.337%
1.522%
1.838%
2.942%
0.824%
0.119%
0.016%
0.244%
0.030%
0.041%
1.442%
0.073%
2.298%
1.604%
0.093%
5.312%

Bus Load
Real Power
(MW)
77.77
37.78
54.30
70.30
45.48
24.65
43.95
192.21
10.74
54.46
0.16
32.26
76.30
49.69
60.01
96.06
26.90
3.89
0.52
7.97
0.98
1.34
47.08
2.38
75.03
52.37
3.04
173.44

Table 3.4. Continued

Bus Number
38
40
41
42
43
44
48
50
52
54
56
62
63
65
67
72
74
76
80
84

Bus Name
Cayey
Santa Isabel
Comerio
Barranquitas
Toro Negro
Juana Diaz
San Juan
Mora
Arecibo
Mayaguez
Guayanilla
Pfizer
Manatí
Salinas
Guyama
Aguas Buenas
Bayamón
Yabucoa
Manuabo
Monacillos

Total
Population
[42]
48,065
23,389
20,779
30,402
1,399
50,676
355,074
161,884
94,658
87,712
21,368
108,862
43,772
30,981
45,345
28,599
189,159
37,655
12,225
96,226

40

% Population
of Total
1.899%
0.924%
0.821%
1.201%
0.055%
2.002%
14.025%
6.394%
3.739%
3.465%
0.844%
4.300%
1.729%
1.224%
1.791%
1.130%
7.472%
1.487%
0.483%
3.801%

Bus Load
Real Power
(MW)
62.00
30.17
26.81
39.21
1.80
65.37
457.92
208.76
122.08
113.13
27.56
140.40
56.45
39.96
58.48
36.89
243.96
48.55
15.77
124.10

Figure 3.2. Power flow solution of the Puerto Rico system using Newton-Raphson method
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According to the transmission power flow of the Puerto Rico system, contour
maps were generated to visually show the real and reactive power at each bus,
along with the real and reactive power flow in the lines, as seen in Figure 3.3 to
Figure 3.6. From the contour maps, it is confirmed that real power consumption is
highest in the northern part of the island. Real power flow is also highest on the
transmission lines coming from the south of the island where most of the power
is generated.
3.1.3 Overview of the Dynamics of the Puerto Rico Power Transmission
System
The dynamics of the Puerto Rico system were generated using typical generator,
exciter, and turbine governor dynamic models based on the plant type: thermal3,
hydroelectric, or renewables. The models used for each generation type are
summarized in Table 3.5. Since the capacities of hydro power plants in the
Puerto Rico power grid are small, no turbine governors are considered and
modeled for hydro power plants. Solar power plants use the generic PV dynamic
model developed by General Electric. Wind power plants apply the Type 3
(doubly-fed induction generator) wind turbine generator model, also from General
Electric. For all thermal plants, frequency deadbands have been modeled into the
turbine governors. Specific model parameters for each model can be found in the
dynamic file.
3.1.4 Dynamic Simulations Performed on the Developed 2018 PREPA
Transmission Model
To test the dynamic model and better understand the impact of various
contingencies on the system, a few dynamic simulations were run. First, a base
case with no contingencies was simulated. As seen in Figure 3.7, the system
frequency stays at 60 Hz at the steady state.
Next, a few dynamic simulations were tested to examine system response after
contingencies.
Generation Trip: The first contingency was tripping the Costa Sur steam plant
located in Guayanilla, a municipality located in southern coast of the island (as
displayed in Figure 3.8). This plant is loaded at about 681 MW in steady state
conditions. A drop in frequency can be seen in Figure 3.9 due to the loss of
generation. The frequency nadir is close to 59.3 Hz, which is a value of typical
under-frequency-load-shedding thresholds in contiguous U.S. power grids.

3

In this first-stage study, all thermal plant machines (gas, steam, and combined cycled) were
given the same type of dynamic models.
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Figure 3.3. Contour map of real power at each bus in the PREPA system

Figure 3.4. Contour map of reactive power at each bus in the PREPA system
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Figure 3.5. Contour map of line MW flow in the PREPA system

Figure 3.6. Contour map of line MVar flow in the PREPA system
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Table 3.5. Generator dynamic models in the Puerto Rico power system model

Generator Type
Gas, Steam, and
Combined Cycle
Hydro
Solar
Wind

Generator

Exciter or
Electrical
Controller

Turbine Governor

GENROU

EXPIC1

URGS3T

GENSAL
GEPVG
GEWTG2

SCRX
GEPVE
GEWTE2

None
None
GEWTT1

Figure 3.7. Frequency response in no-contingency simulation
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Figure 3.8. Map of Puerto Rico indicating Guayanilla [43]

Figure 3.9. Frequency response after tripping the Costa Sur Steam Plant (681 MW)
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Load Shedding: In the second contingency, load at a substation was tripped in
Caguas, a city and municipality of Puerto Rico located south of San Juan (as
shown in Figure 3.10). The tripped load amount is 198 MW. An increase in
frequency can be seen in Figure 3.11 after the load shedding. As this load
shedding amount is relatively small, this frequency deviation is within the safe
range of the typical over-frequency protection relay setting for generators.
Bus/Branch Fault: Bus fault and branch fault contingency simulations were also
performed. A zero-impedance fault was applied for both the bus and branch at 1
second and then cleared at 1.05 seconds. The bus fault occurred at the 115kV
bus at the Hato Rey substation (Figure 3.14), a densely populated barrio in the
municipality of San Juan. The branch fault occurred on the 230kV transmission
line connecting Guayanilla and Manatí (Figure 3.15), a municipality on the
northern coast. Results for the bus fault are shown in Figure 3.13 and Figure
3.14, and results for the branch fault are presented in Figure 3.16 and Figure
3.17. For both fault contingencies, the system frequency had an increase due to
the acceleration of the generator rotors, followed by a ring-down process after
clearing the fault. Additionally, for the transmission fault contingency, a local
oscillation can be observed during frequency restoration, seen in Figure 3.16.
Substation Failure: The Santa Isabel substation was tripped. Santa Isabel is a
municipality located near the southern coast of the island (as shown in Figure
3.18). This plant is loaded at about 34 MW and has 49.5 MW of generation in the
steady state condition. This generation is from a wind farm in Santa Isabel with a
capacity of 75 MW. A drop in frequency can be seen Figure 3.19 due to the loss
of generation and the fact that the total generation loss from this bus is greater
than the total load loss.
Corridor Trip: A few major corridors, or clusters, of transmission lines were
tripped. The transmission lines selected for each group act as key pathways to
transmit power from major generation buses in the south to large load buses in the
north. After individual clusters were tripped, groups of two adjacent clusters were
tripped at the same time. The purpose of these simulations is to show what would
happen if a natural disaster, such as a hurricane, would trip a group of main
transmission lines.
After each simulation was run, a branch loading report was generated to see if
any branches in the system were over 100% of their rating and if any bus
voltages were outside of 0.95 p.u. and 1.05 p.u. Results are summarized in Table
3.6.
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Figure 3.10. Map of Puerto Rico indicating Caguas [43]

Figure 3.11. Frequency response after 198MW load shedding in Caguas
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Figure 3.12. Map of Puerto Rico indicating the Hato Rey substation [43]

Figure 3.13. Frequency response after a fault on the 115kV bus at the Hato Rey substation (Bus
21)
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Figure 3.14. System voltage after a fault on the 115kV bus at the Hato Rey substation (Bus 21)

Figure 3.15. Map of Puerto Rico indicating approximate 230kV transmission path from Guayanilla
to Manatí [43]
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Figure 3.16. Frequency response after a three-phase short-circuit fault on the Guayanilla- Manatí
230kV transmission line

Figure 3.17. System voltage after a three-phase short-circuit fault on the Guayanilla-Manati
230kV transmission line
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Figure 3.18. Map of Puerto Rico indicating the Santa Isabel substation [43]

Figure 3.19. Frequency response after tripping Santa Isabel substation
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Figure 3.20. Transmission map indicating Cluster 1 with annotations added to map from [38]
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Figure 3.21. Frequency response after tripping Cluster 1
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Figure 3.22. Transmission map indicating Cluster 2 with annotations added to map from [38]
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Figure 3.23. Frequency response after tripping Cluster 2
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Figure 3.24. Transmission map indicating Cluster 3 with annotations added to map from [38]
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Figure 3.25. Frequency response after tripping Cluster 3
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Figure 3.26. Transmission map indicating Cluster 4 with annotations added to map from [38]
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Figure 3.27. Frequency response after tripping Cluster 4

Figure 3.28. Frequency response after tripping Cluster 1 and Cluster 4
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Figure 3.29. Frequency response after tripping Cluster 1 and Cluster 2

Figure 3.30. Frequency response after tripping Cluster 2 and Cluster 3
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Figure 3.31. Frequency response after tripping Cluster 3 and Cluster 4
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Table 3.6. Branch overload and out-of-limit voltage report from corridor trip simulations

Cluster(s)
Tripped
Cluster 1

Cluster 2

Cluster 3
Cluster 4
Clusters 1 and 4

Clusters 1 and 2

Clusters 2 and 3

Clusters 3 and 4

Branch Overload Results
No branches above 100% of
rated loading
1 transformer branch
overloaded: Salinas A and
Salinas B – 103.0% of Rate1
loading
No branches above 100% of
rated loading
No branches above 100% of
rated loading
No branches above 100% of
rated loading
1 transformer branch
overloaded: Salinas A and
Salinas B – 100.1% of Rate1
loading
1 transformer branch
overloaded: Salinas A and
Salinas B – 102.3% of Rate1
loading
No branches above 100% of
rated loading
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Out-of-Limit Voltage Results
No buses outside of 0.95 p.u.
and 1.05 p.u.
No buses outside of 0.95 p.u.
and 1.05 p.u.
No buses outside of 0.95 p.u.
and 1.05 p.u.
No buses outside of 0.95 p.u.
and 1.05 p.u.
No buses outside of 0.95 p.u.
and 1.05 p.u.
No buses outside of 0.95 p.u.
and 1.05 p.u.

No buses outside of 0.95 p.u.
and 1.05 p.u.
No buses outside of 0.95 p.u.
and 1.05 p.u.

Though the system appears to be relatively robust during corridor trips, these
results will need to be validated by real-time frequency and voltage
measurements from deployed UGA units. Further detail regarding the placement
of UGA sensors is provided in Section 3.2. Additionally, equipment parameters
may need to be adjusted to more truly reflect the PREPA system.
3.1.5 PPREPA Transmission System Mapping
To better visualize the PREPA 2018 transmission model, and more easily
compare connections to the transmission map in Figure 3.1, a map of the system
was generated in ArcMap software. Each substation was assigned an
approximate GPS coordinate based on its geographic location. Buses and
branches were mapped in ArcMap, as displayed in Figure 3.32. To do this, bus
and branch coordinates were imported as layers into ArcMap. Branches were
assumed to be linear between each bus. The two voltage levels are indicated by
distinct colors, where 115kV is red, and 230kV is blue.

Placement of Universal Grid Analyzer (UGA) Measurements
for Dynamic Model Validation
The UGA is low-cost, GPS-synchronized device that measures highly accurate
frequency, voltage, phase angle, and power quality measurements. UGAs are a
part of the FNET/GridEye system, which is a wide-area power system frequency
network of grid measurement devices. UGAs are installed by connecting the
device to a standard 120V electrical outlet and connecting a GPS antenna for
data synchronization. Although UGAs are directly connected at the distribution
level, a network of UGAs can provide both wide-area and local event location
and detection.
A more accurate power grid model will facilitate many advanced operation and
planning functions in the control center of the PREPA system. Since the UGA
has the capability to capture power grid behaviors accurately, this work will
deploy UGA units in the PREPA system and use measurement data to validate
the PREPA system model. Additionally, it is predicted that the Puerto Rico power
grid will likely see a large increase in solar and other renewables in the next 2-10
years. It is necessary to have models with high renewable penetration to forecast
any system stability problems. Deployment of these sensors can provide
situational awareness to understand impacts on changes within the
infrastructure.
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Figure 3.32. PREPA transmission system generated in ArcMap (red - 115kV; blue - 230kV)
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UGAs in the Puerto Rico system can collect data system-wide and share data
with Puerto Rico power engineers to assist them in their system performance
assessment and system enhancement effort. Currently there are four UGA units
deployed. Eighteen locations were proposed as sites for installation of additional
units. Possible locations include a few large generation plants, large load areas,
and hydro plants, along with a solar farm and wind farm.
Several criteria were involved in sensor placement, including the following:
monitoring locations with high generation, monitoring locations with high load,
geographically placing sensors to cover the island, and placing sensors near a
variety of generation sources and renewable machines. Additionally, sensors
were requested to be placed near transmission substations with
telecommunications capabilities. Table 3.7 lists existing locations, Table 3.8 lists
proposed locations, and Figure 3.33 geographically shows both existing and
proposed UGA locations.
To provide examples of how this monitoring system can assist PREPA and other
stakeholders in grid-wide and local situational awareness, a few system events
are shown in following figures. An outage was reported in the Mayaguez region
on 08/02/2018 around 4:51 UTC, as shown in Figure 3.34 Looking at the results
from the measured data, there was a drop in frequency due to the loss of
generation at the Mayaguez power plant, and frequency swings are evident as
the system tries to stabilize to a settling frequency. Fast frequency ramp-up and
local oscillations are also very common in the system, as shown in Figure 3.35
and Figure 3.36. In Figure 3.35, the increase in frequency suggests either a load
drop or fast frequency ramp up occurred. Local oscillations in the system are
common. An example of a local oscillation is shown in Figure 3.36, indicated by
fluctuations in measured frequency.
A more systematic analysis of PREPA measurement will be carried out in Phase
II. Additionally, data from UGAs deployed in Puerto Rico will be used to validate
and refine the UTK-developed 2018 model and PREPA-developed models of the
system. To validate the models, events captured by UGAs can be simulated.
Simulated results will reveal differences between model parameters and the
actual system. Model parameters can then be modified to more closely match the
behavior of the actual system.
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Table 3.7. Existing Puerto Rico UGA Locations

Existing UGA Locations
UGA Number
Location
1
Mayaguez
2
Yauco
3
San Juan
4
Viaducto

Table 3.8. Proposed Puerto Rico UGA Locations

Proposed UGA Locations
UGA Number
Location
1
Manatí
2
Caguas
3
Humacao
4
Canóvanas
5
Fajardo
6
Victoria
7
Acacias
8
Martín Peña
9
Barrio Piñas
10
Bayamón
11
Arecibo
12
Ponce
13
Jobos
14
Covadonga
15
Barranquitas
16
Juan Martín
17
Juncos
18
Santa Isabel
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Figure 3.33. Map of existing and proposed UGA locations in Puerto Rico with annotations added to map from [38]
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Figure 3.34. Frequency measured by UGAs during generation trip event followed by power
swings detected on 08/02/2018 at 04:51:02 UTC

Figure 3.35. Frequency measured by UGAs during fast frequency ramp up or possible load drop
detected on 09/03/2018 at 12:17:20 UTC
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Figure 3.36. Frequency measured by UGAs during local oscillation detected on 08/02/2018 at
19:00:42 UTC
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Dynamic Simulations Performed on the 2022 PREPADeveloped Model
After developing the transmission model for PREPA’s 2018 model, additional
models, developed by PREPA and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
(PNNL), were provided. These models were based on PREPA’s system
expected for years 2019, 2021, and 2022 but were developed before the
hurricane occurred. Therefore, an additional model needed to be developed to
represent the system as it was before the hurricane, along with other models that
could represent the system during and after the rebuilding process. Before other
post-hurricane models were created, one of the PREPA-developed models was
used for study. The 2022 day-peak model was selected because it reflects the
system’s behavior under peak demand. A benefit of using the PREPA-developed
model is increased detail of the model and equipment parameters. The 2022
PREPA-developed model contains 1,394 buses at the transmission,
subtransmission, and distribution levels, with 91 in-service machines.
Branch corridor trips, similar to what were performed on the 2018 model, were
simulated on the 2022 model. Since the 2022 model has a greater number of
buses, more voltage levels, and different topology than the 2018 model, results
are not directly comparable between the two models. Out of all branch corridor
trip combinations, the worst case was tripping the clusters indicated in Figure
3.37, with overloading occurring at 27 buses in the system mostly at the 38kV
level. The frequency response after tripping these branches is provided in Figure
3.38. These results show the criticality of the main branches that transfer power
from the key generation facilities to the main load areas.
As Puerto Rico continues to rebuild their grid after recent hurricanes, increased
solar penetration is expected to be integrated in the system. In the PREPAdeveloped 2022 peak demand case, the generation mix is approximately 29%
renewable, when considering the real power output of in-service machines.
Penetration was increased by approximately 20% each time by replacing nonrenewable machines with real power output equal to approximately 20% of total
generation. To substitute non-renewable machine models in the dynamic file, the
generator model for the replaced machine was set to GEPVG, and the exciter
model was set to GEPVE. These models are generic PV dynamic models
developed by General Electric. Typical parameters for the GEPVG and GEPVE
models are provided in Table 3.9 and Table 3.10.
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Figure 3.37. Worst-case corridor trip combination for 2022 PREPA-developed model with annotations added to map from [38]
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Figure 3.38. Frequency response of tripping worst-case corridor trip combination for 2022
PREPA-developed model

Table 3.9. Typical parameters for GEPVG model

Parameter
Xeq-equivalent reactance for current injection
VHVRCR2- HVRCR voltage 2
CURHVRCR2- Max reactive current at VHVRCR2
Rlp_LVPL-Rate of active current change
T_LVPL-Voltage sensor for LVPL
LVPL voltage 1
LVPL power 1
LVPL voltage 2
LVPL power 2
LVPL voltage 3
LVPL power 3
XLVPL
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Value
99999
1.2
2.0
5.0
0.02
0.0
0.0
0.5
0.167
0.9
0.9
0.0

Table 3.10. Typical parameters for GEPVE model

Parameter
Tfv - V-regulator filter
Kpv - V-regulator proportional gain
Kiv - V-regulator integrator gain
Rc - line drop compensation resistance
Xc - line drop compensation reactance
QMX - V –regulator max limit
QMN - V –regulator min limit
IPMAX – Max active current limit
TRV - V-sensor
KQi – MVAR/Volt gain
VMINCL
VMAXCL
KVi – VoltMVAR gain
XIQmin - min. limit for Eq’cmd
XIQmax – max. limit for Eq’cmd
TV - Lag time constant in WindVar Controller
Tp - Pelec filter in fast PF controller
Fn - A portion of the on-line PV controllers
ImaxTD – Converter current limit
Iphl - Hard active current limit
Iqhl - Hard reactive current limit
Tlpqd - Reactive droop time constant
Kqd - Reactive droop gain
Xqd - Reactive droop synthesizing Impedance
Vermx - Reactive power control maximum error
signal
Vermn - Reactive power control minimum error signal
Vfrz - Reactive power control freeze voltage
PFAFLG: (=1 if PF fast control enabled)
VARFLG: (=1 if Qord is provided by SolarVar)
PQFLG: (=1 for P priority, =0 for Q priority)
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Value
0.15
18.0
5.0
0.0
0.0
1.0
-1.0
1.12
0.02
0.1
0.88
1.15
120
0.55
1.55
0.05
0.05
1.0
1.12
1.12
1.12
5.0
0.0
0.0
0.01
-0.01
0.7
0.0
1.0
1.0

The solar penetration of the system was increased by replacing more nonrenewable machines with solar. The graphs in Figure 3.39, Figure 3.40, and
Figure 3.41 show the dynamic effects of tripping a machine at the Ecosteam
Power Plant, 98.5 MW of generation, at various penetration levels without relays
incorporated into the model. Frequency of each machine was monitored. From
the results, it can be seen that the frequency nadir, or minimum post-contingency
frequency, decreases as solar penetration increases.
Additionally, frequency does not appear to settle for a long duration, even after
30 seconds, in cases with higher solar levels. These results infer the system
becomes less stable with increased penetration. Because large rotating
machines are being replaced with solar, some inertia in the system is lost.
Frequency nadir and setting frequency are directly affected by system inertia
level.
These simulations were repeated with the inclusion of load and line relays in the
system. Under-frequency load and line relays were included in the original 2022
PREPA-developed model. The load relay protection model was DLSHBL. This
protection model was only added to some of the load buses at the 38kV level.
The parameters for each DLSHBL protection model, listed in Table 3.11, varied
for each individual load so that different loads were shed at specified frequencies
and times. UFLT relays were set so that if the frequency, measured at a certain
bus, dropped below a threshold for the duration of the under-frequency timer, a
specified branch would trip. The main parameters for this model include the
under-frequency threshold, under-frequency timer, and the bus for the frequency
measurement. Machine voltage and frequency relays were not included in this
model. System frequency response of tripping 98.5 MW, with relays included in
the model, is presented in Figure 3.42, Figure 3.43, and Figure 3.44. Load and
line under-frequency relays reduced the magnitude of swings in frequency seen
in the system and increased the frequency nadir. Despite this, frequency nadir
still drops with increased solar penetration. Sustained oscillations are also seen
for cases with more solar.

Summary
Through this project, UTK was able to provide DOE with a 2018 transmission
study model based on data provided in PREPA’s Fourteenth Annual Report and
operational profile provided on their website. Additionally, system security was
assessed through corridor trip simulations and increased solar penetration.
These studies provided DOE with more insight into with what areas of the system
are most vulnerable and how dynamic response is affected by increased solar
integration.
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Figure 3.39. Frequency response of tripping 98.5 MW in 2022 PREPA-developed system with
29% renewable penetration

Figure 3.40. Frequency response of tripping 98.5 MW in 2022 PREPA-developed system with
52% renewable penetration
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Figure 3.41. Frequency response of tripping 98.5 MW in 2022 PREPA-developed system with
72% renewable penetration

Table 3.11. Parameters for DLSHBL load under-frequency protection model

Con Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Con Description
f1, first load shed point (Hz)
t1, first point pickup time (Sec.)
frac1, first fraction of load shed
f2, second load shed point (Hz)
t2, second point pickup time (Sec.)
frac2, second fraction of load shed
f3, third load shed point (Hz)
t3, third point pickup time (Sec.)
frac3, third fraction of load shed
TB, breaker time (Sec.)
df1, first rate of freq. shed pt. (Hz/sec.) (>=0)
df2, second rate of freq. shed pt. (Hz/sec.) (>=0)
df3, third rate of freq. shed pt. (Hz/sec.) (>=0)
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Figure 3.42. Frequency response of tripping 98.5 MW in 2022 PREPA-developed system with
29% renewable penetration and load and line relays

Figure 3.43. Frequency response of tripping 98.5 MW in 2022 PREPA-developed system with
52% renewable penetration and load and line relays
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Figure 3.44. Frequency response of tripping 98.5 MW in 2022 PREPA-developed system with
72% renewable penetration and load and line relays
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4
ASSESSING SECURITY DURING CYBER-ATTACKS AND
WIDE-AREA PHYSICAL ATTACKS ON BULK ELECTRIC
SYSTEM ASSETS
The focus of the study was to analyze the effects of targeted attacks on
substations, or a specific group of substations. It was assumed that the intended
attack was successful and that contingencies have occurred. This security
assessment primarily focuses on dynamic frequency stability immediately
following a major contingency. The study involves two main parts: 1) creating a
geographic map representing the system model used in the study and 2)
performing possible cyber-attack scenarios and analyzing the system’s response.

Literature Review
On December 23rd, 2015, the first successful cyber-induced power outage that
disrupted an electric power grid occurred in Ukraine. Up to 225,000 customers
were affected over the 6-hour period of the attack, with more than 50 substations
impacted [44]. The primary equipment remotely operated within the substations
were circuit breakers [45]. Most of these stations were at the transmission and
sub-transmission level. For 3 hours following attack, 7 110kV and 23 35kV
substations were disconnected [45].
The success of an attack on the bulk electric system reiterates the enforcement
of North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Critical Infrastructure
Protection (CIP) standards, which involve identifying, categorizing, and protecting
critical assets. The attack also revealed how vulnerable the power grid can be
and what catastrophic consequences a cyber-attack could have. Some of the
largest electric utilities in the U.S. cover a huge territory and serve millions of
customers, which makes them potential targets of hackers. For example,
Dominion Energy’s generating facilities produce approximately 31 GW electric
power and its network consists of 93,600 miles of transmission and distribution
lines [46]. If a hacker manages to hack into a large electric utility’s control center
into the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system, catastrophic
consequences could occur. Although the SCADA Internet Protocol (IP)
communication network should be separated from other corporate networks,
hackers can gain access to SCADA at either the supervisory control level or the
direct control level. The supervisory control level is comprised of a user interface
that allows operators to monitor and control system equipment; the direct control
level contains devices, such as programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and
remote terminal units (RTUs) that actuate system equipment under specified
conditions [47]. If firmware of direct control level devices is not updated,
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encryption data protocols are not used for data transmission, or devices are not
properly password protected, these controllers could be vulnerable to an attack
[47].
Threats of an attack of from an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) are also a major
concern. An EMP is a nuclear weapon detonated in the upper atmosphere so
that a pulse causes interference with electronic devices across a large
geographic area [48]. The effects of an EMP depend on the size of the weapon,
along with the altitude at which the EMP is detonated. In some cases, an EMP
may be able to take out an area as big as an entire large city, or country in some
cases. A geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) is caused by solar flares and
associated coronal mass injections, or solar storms [49]. A GMD induces
transmission lines with additional, unregulated current, causing mechanical
failures and power outages [49].
According to previous research in cyber-attacks on bulk electric systems, more
research is needed to predict stability of several combinations of hypothesized
attacks, such as tripping multiple substations, considering both their steady-state
and dynamic effects [50]. This would reduce the number of permutations of
possible attacks and identify critical points in the system. Previous studies have
developed algorithms, such as the reverse pyramid model, to identify
combinations of critical substations, that when disconnected could cause
cascading outages [51]. Though these methods are useful for classifying
substations as critical or non-critical based on power flow, they do not always
recognize dynamic behaviors that may cause instability. Dynamic security
assessment is necessary because even though a system may converge in power
flow, the system may not be dynamically stable after certain contingencies have
occurred. In past research that looks at both power flow and dynamic study of
cyber-attacks, substations are classified as being critical or non-critical. In one
study, dynamic effects are created by the sequence of switching actions. Further
research is needed to determine critical switching actions that would cause the
system to become unstable, even if a system could still be defined as stable in
steady state [50]. Therefore, in this study, dynamic stability of the system is
assessed while multiple substations are switched offline at once in various
configurations to create more vulnerable scenarios.

Development of the Atlantis 9000 Model Mapping for the
Purpose of Cyber-Security System Study
4.1.1 Introduction of Atlantis 9000 Model
The purpose of the Atlantis 9000 model was to assign GPS coordinates to a
system in PSS®E where GPS coordinates are not provided, and then display the
system on a map. For the cybersecurity study, the mapping tool provides a way
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to geographically display the size of a critical contingency. The model is named
Atlantis because the system is mapped to represent an imaginary island, and
9000 is the approximate number of buses in the system. Two different methods
were used to generate a map of the system: 1) programmatic conversion of
PSS®E Cartesian coordinates to GPS coordinates and 2) Power Systems
Graphic Toolbox (PSGT) developed by Dr. Zhuohong Pan.
4.1.2 Programmatic Conversion of PSS®E Cartesian Coordinates to GPS
Coordinates
4.1.2.1 Step 1: Mapping in PSS®E
The Auto-Draw function in PSS®E allows a user to create a diagram centered on
a bus and then grow the diagram up to 15 levels from the center bus. In the
following example, a system containing 9,241 buses is shown. To include all
9,241 buses in the diagram, the diagram was expanded several times. This was
achieved by selecting a border bus as the center bus and growing the diagram
15 levels from this bus. A full diagram containing all buses and branches in the
system is presented in Figure 4.1.
4.1.2.2 Step 2: Conversion of Bus Cartesian Coordinates to GPS Coordinates
Cartesian coordinates of a diagram in PSS®E can be extracted by exporting bus
locations as Cartesian coordinates. These coordinates were saved into a PSS®E
location file and then copied into a Python script. The Python script converted the
Cartesian coordinates to GPS coordinates by assigning a scale of the X and Y
coordinates to latitude and longitude, respectively. A GPS origin was provided so
that the user could assign where to center the map on the globe. In the example
provided, the origin was specified as a point in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean
since the diagram did not geographically correspond to any geographic
continent. A rotation function was also included so the system could be rotated
90 degrees clockwise. The modified coordinates were then written to a CSV file.
4.1.2.3 Step 3: Displaying System in Google Earth
In Google Earth, a list of GPS coordinates, in latitude/longitude pairs, can be
imported from a CSV file, as long as “Latitude” and “Longitude” are given as the
first two column headings and each corresponding points are underneath these
headings. A map of the system in Google Earth is shown in Figure 4.2
4.1.3 Mapping the System Using PSGT
PSGT is a tool developed by Dr. Zhuohong Pan. The purpose of the tool is to
locate substations and transmission lines on a map with computer-aided design
to display data and results. PSGT displays power grids based on GPS
coordinates of the system; draws lines according to the topology; and colorcodes areas of the system by the area, zone, voltage level, or other attributes.
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Figure 4.1. Atlantis 9000 system diagram showing buses and branches
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Figure 4.2. Google Earth view of Atlantis 9000 system
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A more detailed description of how to use the tool is in the Appendix in Section
A.4. The 9,241-bus system mapped previously in Google Earth was also mapped
in the PSGT tool. The system is color-coded by zone and by voltage levels in
Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4, respectively. The 9,241-bus system contains 24 zones
and 9 voltage levels ranging from 110kV-750kV. Zone 1 acts as an
interconnection between the other 23 zones.

Modeling Dynamic Effects of Possible Cyber-Attack
Scenarios
The Atlantis 9000 model was used for all simulations in studying the effects of
cyber-attack scenarios. The simulations performed could imitate someone
hacking into a large electric utility, attacking a Regional Transmission
Organization (RTO) or Independent Service Organization (ISO), or even creating
a cascading cyber-attack. An example of a cascading cyber-attack would be if a
group of cyber-attackers hack into more than one electric utilities/RTO/ISO in an
organized way. In this case, the entire interconnection may be in danger because
of the system synchronization. Though many types and combinations of
contingencies could be introduced during a cyber-attack, worst case scenarios
were considered, starting from tripping the largest generators, loads, or major
substations within areas of the system. During the initial phases of this project,
frequency and voltage stability issues were the focus of this impact evaluation
study, although small-signal, and transient stability issues could also be
considered. The base frequency of the Atlantis 9000 model is 50 Hz. The system
contains 353,178.8 MW of total generation and 340,610.8 MW of total load.
4.1.4 Scenario #1: Tripping Largest Generation Facilities within a Given
Zone
This scenario simulates the effects of a hacker obtaining access to a large
electric utility’s control center. In this part, dynamic simulations were conducted
to investigate the impacts of shutting down multiple generation facilities within an
electric utility.
For example, in Zone 6, all generation facilities over a specified real power output
were tripped in each simulation. Zone 6 had 133 machines with a combined real
power output of approximately 38,779 MW. The threshold was adjusted until a
boundary between convergence and divergence of the system was obtained.
From the results, the system diverged when tripping generator buses with output
greater than 565 MW and converged when changing this threshold to 570 MW.
The results, summarized in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2, show the boundary of
percentage of total generation in the system tripped is around 4%.
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Figure 4.3. Zone view in PSGT

Figure 4.4. Voltage level view in PSGT
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Table 4.1. Summary of simulations results from tripping generator buses with output greater than
570 MW in Zone 6

Threshold (MW)
Total Tripped (MW)
Total Generation in Zone (MW)
Percentage of Generation in
Zone Tripped
Percentage of Generation in
System Tripped
Convergence

570
14131.02
39778.96
35.52%
4.00%
Yes

Figure 4.5. Frequency response of tripping generators with output greater than 570 MW in Zone 6
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Figure 4.6. System voltage while tripping generators with output greater than 570 MW in Zone 6

Table 4.2. Summary of simulations results from tripping generator buses with output greater than
565 MW in Zone 6

Threshold (MW)
Total Tripped (MW)
Total Generation in Zone (MW)
Percentage of Generation in
Zone Tripped
Percentage of Generation in
System Tripped
Convergence
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565
14698.02
39778.96
36.95%
4.16%
No

Figure 4.7. Frequency response of tripping generators with output greater than 565 MW in Zone 6

Figure 4.8. System voltage while tripping generators with output greater than 565 MW in Zone 6
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Although frequency appears to be stable when tripping generators with output
greater than 570 MW, some buses deviate outside of stable voltage limits (0.95
p.u.-1.05 p.u.) when approaching the border. When the threshold is changed so
that all generators greater than 565 MW are tripped, frequency splits into two
separate systems, and the voltage is clearly out of stable limits at several buses.
Scenario #1 was repeated for several zones. The ratio of generation tripped to
total system generation was below 10% for all cases tested, but the threshold
and percentage of generation tripped in the zone greatly varied depending on the
size of the zone.
4.1.5 Scenario #2: Tripping Multiple High-Voltage Substations in a Given
Zone
An RTO/ISO coordinates, controls and monitors the operation of the electric
transmission system encompassing a large area. If a hacker seizes an RTO/ISO
SCADA under control using malware, he or she can remotely switch substations
off and potentially disrupt electricity supply to several customers. In this scenario,
a successful hacking of an RTO/ISO is simulated by tripping a number of highvoltage substations within a large zone.
As mentioned in Section 4.2, the system contains nine voltage levels ranging
from 110kV-750kV. Because the Atlantis 9000 model is a transmission model
without showing distribution details, load buses were typically included at the
lower end of the transmission voltage range. Step-up transformers were also
included in the model to increase the voltage at substations connecting
generation facilities to the grid. Though all system voltage levels were considered
high-voltage, substations at only the highest voltages were selected to trip. Since
only three buses in the system were at 750kV, buses at 400kV tripped. The
400kV buses were all located in Zone 1, which acts as the main interconnection
between the other 23 zones.
In Zone 1, there are 126 buses at 400kV. If all 126 buses are tripped, the system
diverges. Therefore, a set number of the 400kV buses were selected to trip at
one time. The exact 400kV buses to trip in Zone 1 were selected at random. In a
specific example using this method, the maximum number of 400kV buses that
could be tripped without the system diverging was 20 buses. The frequency
response and bus voltages, monitored at the machine buses, while disconnecting
20 400kV buses are displayed in Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10.
From the plots, it can be seen that frequency and voltage are stable after
disconnecting a random set of 20 400kV buses in Zone 1. If one additional 400kV
bus is tripped in Zone 1, system frequency and voltage are no longer stable, as
seen by the plots in Figure 4.11, Figure 4.12, and Figure 4.13.
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Figure 4.9. Frequency response of tripping 20 400kV buses in Zone 1

Figure 4.10. System voltage while tripping 20 400kV buses in Zone 1
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Figure 4.11. Frequency response of tripping 21 400kV buses in Zone 1

Figure 4.12. Frequency response of tripping 21 400kV buses in Zone 1 zoomed in view
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Figure 4.13. System voltage while tripping 21 400kV buses in Zone 1
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The system appears to split into two parts, with some machines stabilizing
around nominal voltage and frequency, while others continue to wildly oscillate.
The number of 400kV buses in Zone 1 tripped that cause instability vary
depending on what set of buses are selected to trip. In some cases, even tripping
less than 10 400kV buses could cause instability due to the criticality of the
buses.
4.1.6 Scenario #3: Radial Area Attack Created by Tripping N-Levels from
the Largest Generator in a Given Zone
This scenario models the effects of an EMP or strategic cyber-attack targeting a
specific radial area of the system. The largest generator in a specified zone was
selected as the origin point for the attack. The geographic area affected by the
attack was expanded, in stages, to determine the point where the system would
no longer be stable. The contingency expansion was performed by disconnecting
buses at each level from the origin, along with the transmission lines between
them. Although any generator in a zone could be chosen at the origin point, the
largest generator was selected because it represents the largest N-1
contingency. First, a simulation was run in PSS®E where the largest generator
bus was tripped in Zone 20. Under this contingency, the frequencies of all
machine buses in the system were monitored and plotted over a period of 20
seconds, as seen in Figure 4.14 and Figure 4.15.
This scenario targets a group of directly connected substations. The goal was to
determine the maximum amount of load and generation that could be tripped
before the system diverged, essentially by seeing how many substations directly
connected to the selected bus could be tripped. To do this, a series of
contingencies were applied in stages. First, the bus containing the largest
generator within a particular zone was tripped. The example shown in is bus
7979 in Zone 20. Next, every bus directly connected to the bus containing the
largest generator was also tripped. In this example, the buses directly connected
to bus 7979 are buses 8580, 8715, 4817, 5062, and 6790. This step was called
Stage 1 and is represented in Figure 4.17. In Stage 2, every bus connected to
the additional buses tripped in Stage 1 were also tripped. The buses included in
Stage 2 are shown in Figure 4.18. Five buses are connected to buses 8580,
8715, 4817, 5062, and 6790.
Simulations were run for each additional contingency stage. The size of the
contingency was grown by one level at a time until the system diverged. The
system frequency responses of tripping a number of bus levels from the largest
generator in Zone 20 are included in Table 4.3 through Table 4.7. The frequency
of every machine bus in the entire system was monitored for a period of 20
seconds, with the contingency being introduced at 1 second.
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Figure 4.14. Frequency response while tripping the largest generator in Zone 20

Figure 4.15. Frequency response while tripping the largest generator in Zone 20 zoomed in view
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Figure 4.16. Atlantis 9000 model generator bus 7979

Figure 4.17. Atlantis 9000 Stage 1 connections to bus 7979
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Figure 4.18. Atlantis 9000 Stage 2 connections to bus 7979
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Table 4.3. Frequency response of tripping 1 level from largest generator in Zone 20

Contingency Frequency Response

Total
Load
Tripped

Total
Generation
Tripped

586 MW

1637 MW

Table 4.4. Frequency response of tripping 2 levels from largest generator in Zone 20

Contingency Frequency Response
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Total
Load
Tripped

Total
Generation
Tripped

1264 MW

1637 MW

Table 4.5. Frequency response of tripping 3 levels from largest generator in Zone 20

Contingency Frequency Response

Total
Load
Tripped

Total
Generation
Tripped

1929 MW

2804 MW

Table 4.6. Frequency response of tripping 4 levels from largest generator in Zone 20

Contingency Frequency Response
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Total
Load
Tripped

Total
Generation
Tripped

4008 MW

2988 MW

Table 4.7. Frequency response of tripping 5 levels from largest generator in Zone 20

Contingency Frequency Response

Total
Load
Tripped

Total
Generation
Tripped

6369 MW

5292 MW

Figure 4.19. System voltage while tripping 4 levels from largest generator in Zone 20
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Figure 4.20. System voltage while tripping 5 levels from largest generator in Zone 20

Figure 4.21. Google Earth image of entire Atlantis 9000 system buses (yellow) and buses tripped
in Stage 5 (red) from tripping largest generator in Zone 20
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In Stages 2 and 3, the frequency of one machine begins to go out of sync with
the rest of the system. This is recognized by seeing how the frequency of the
machine diverges. Although stability seems to be maintained through Stages 1-4,
since nearly all machine frequencies converge close to the nominal frequency of
50 Hz, the system is clearly not stable in Stage 5. It can be concluded that the
system becomes unstable between Stages 4 and 5, or tripping 4,008-6,369 MW
of load and 2,988-5,292 MW of generation. Because both generation and load
are tripped as the contingency grows beyond the origin, it is difficult to find an
exact boundary, as far as the maximum generation and load that can be tripped
in this scenario.
Bus voltages can also be compared between Stage 4 and Stage 5. In Stage 4,
some voltages begin to oscillate to magnitudes outside of the range 0.95-1.05
p.u. In Stage 5, most machine bus voltages diverge well beyond this range.
To show the buses tripped in Stage 5 within the entire system, an additional layer
is added to the map developed in Google Earth. The buses tripped in Stage 5 are
indicated by red dots.
4.1.7 Scenario #4: Radial Area Attack Tripping N-Levels from the Largest
Load in a Given Zone
This scenario is similar to the previous one in that a radial area is tripped with a
load bus selected as the origin point. This time, the largest load bus within a zone
is chosen as the center of the attack. Although any load in a zone could be
tripped, the largest load was selected because it represents a critical N-1
contingency. A simulation was run in PSS®E where the largest load, 542 MW,
was tripped in Zone 14. Under this contingency, the frequency of all machine
buses in the system were monitored and plotted over a period of 20 seconds, as
shown in Figure 4.22 and Figure 4.23.
Results from tripping stages beyond the largest load in Zone 14 are shown until
the system is unstable. System frequency response at each stage is presented in
Table 4.8, and Table 4.9. The system frequency converged in Stage 1 but did not
converge in Stage 2. Additionally, machine bus voltages remained stable through
Stage 1 (Figure 4.24), staying within the range of 0.95-1.05 p.u., but were quite
unstable in Stage 2 (Figure 4.25). The amount of total load tripped at Stage 1
was 806 MW, and the load tripped at Stage 2 is 2,937 MW. The boundary point
can be found by tripping only some of the additional buses tripped in Stage 2
until the system converges again. In this specific scenario, this is more easily
done since only load, no generation, has been tripped though Stage 2. By using
this method, a boundary of approximately 1,500-1,600 MW of load was found,
which accounts for less than 1% of the system total load.
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Figure 4.22. Frequency response while tripping the largest load in Zone 14

Figure 4.23. Frequency response while tripping the largest load in Zone 14 zoomed in view
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Table 4.8. Frequency response of tripping 1 level from largest load in Zone 14

Contingency Frequency Response

Total
Load
Tripped

Total
Generation
Tripped

806 MW

0 MW

Table 4.9.Frequency response of tripping 2 levels from largest load in Zone 14

Contingency Frequency Response
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Total
Load
Tripped

Total
Generation
Tripped

2937 MW

0 MW

Figure 4.24. System voltage while tripping 1 stage from largest load in Zone 14

Figure 4.25. System voltage while tripping 2 stages from largest load in Zone 14
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As indicated by the red dots in Figure 4.26, a smaller geographic region of
tripped buses were necessary to cause the system to become unstable. Because
frequency is dependent upon system balance between generation and load, it is
concluded that this may be due to the significant load drop, without any additional
generation trip.
4.1.8 Adding Generator and Load Relays into the Model During Radial
Area Simulations
In an actual system, relays will be connected to loads and generators. To model
this in PSS®E and see its effect on previous simulation results, relays were
added to all loads and machines. The LDSHAL relay model was associated with
all loads in the system dynamic file with the parameters in Table 4.10. The
FRGDCAT relay model was added to all machines in the system dynamic file
with the parameters in Table 4.11.
The inclusion of load and generator relays in the model did not allow many
contingencies to expand beyond the stage where instability occurred without
relay protection. Again, expanding the contingency from the largest generator in
Zone 20, the results from the final stage when instability occurs are shown. In the
previous example without relay protection, the stage where non-convergence
occurred was Stage 5. The frequency of all machine buses is plotted, this time
with relays added to the model. Comparing through to the results without relays,
it can be seen that the relays do not have a significant effect in stabilizing the
system at this contingency stage.
Similarly, expanding the contingency from the largest load in Zone 14 was also
performed with relays in the system. Though overall frequency deviation is
smaller, relays do not prevent the system from diverging. According to results in
Figure 4.29, the system machine bus frequencies appear to split into two
separate parts. Voltage stability appeared to improve with the inclusion of relays
for this case, as seen in Figure 4.30.
When testing other zones in the system, similar results were observed, where
frequency response somewhat improved but did not prevent the system from
becoming unstable. This is hypothesized to be a result of both load and
generation tripping due to under-frequency and over-frequency settings. Though
the relays are technically implemented to bring the system back to nominal
frequency by balancing load and generation, the tripping of these units, based
upon relay settings, may not necessarily be able to bring the system back to a
stable state.
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Figure 4.26. Google Earth image of entire Atlantis 9000 system buses (yellow) and buses tripped
in Stage 2 (red) from tripping largest load in Zone 14

Table 4.10. LDSHAL relay model parameter settings

Parameter
First load shed point (Hz)
First point pickup time (sec.)
Frac1, first fraction of load shed
Second load shed point (Hz)
Second point pickup time (sec.)
Frac2, second fraction of load shed
Third load shed point (Hz)
Third point pickup time (sec.)
Third fraction of load shed
TB, breaker time (sec.)

Value
59.5
0.2
0.07
59.3
0.2
0.07
59.1
0.2
0.07
0.1
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Table 4.11. FRGDCAT relay model parameter settings

Parameter
FL, lower frequency threshold (Hz)
FU, upper frequency threshold (Hz)
TP, relay pickup time (sec.)
TB, breaker time (sec.)

Value
57.8
61.8
0.0
0.1

Figure 4.27. Frequency response of tripping 5 stages from largest generator in Zone 20 with
relays
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Figure 4.28. System voltage while tripping 5 stages from largest generator in Zone 20 with relays

Figure 4.29. Frequency response of tripping 2 stages from largest load in Zone 14 with relays
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Figure 4.30. System voltage while tripping 2 stages from largest load in Zone 14 with relays
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4.1.9 Scenario #5: Tripping Buses in Multiple Areas Simultaneously
Another type of attack could be groups of substations in two different zones
being tripped simultaneously. For example, the largest generator in Zone 5 and
the largest generator in Zone 22 could be disconnected at the same time. Similar
to the previous examples, a hacker could also trip n-levels beyond a single bus in
one area and n-levels beyond a single bus in another area. The general concept
of this is shown in Figure 4.31. Results are presented for tripping buses in
multiple areas simultaneously.
In this example, the points of origin of the contingency are buses with the largest
generation in Zone 5 and Zone 21. A plot was generated showing the system
frequency response when tripping just the largest generator buses in Zone 5 and
Zone 21.
The frequency response at each stage is shown in Table 4.12 and Table 4.13.
Though some oscillations occurred in Stage 1, the system clearly did not
converge in Stage 2. When tripping n-levels from the largest generator in Zone 5
and Zone 21 individually, the system became unstable in Stage 2 for Zone 5 and
in Stage 3 for Zone 21. Due to the instability caused by the buses tripped in Zone
5, the entire system was already unstable at Stage 2. A map generated in
Google Earth, in Figure 4.32, shows the buses tripped the two areas in Stage 2.
In other scenarios tested while tripping buses in multiple zones simultaneously,
divergence was also reached at the stage when at least one of the areas caused
non-convergence. Though it was previously hypothesized that tripping buses in
multiple areas simultaneously would cause the system to more quickly reach
instability, results inferred that instability of the entire system is dependent upon
which area becomes unstable first for these particular scenarios.

Summary
While studying dynamic effects of possible cyber-attack scenarios, security was
assessed by analyzing consequences of instability under the loss of several
buses or equipment at a time. From the scenarios studied, it can be determined
that percentage of total system generation tripped, percentage of total system
load tripped, and number and location of substations disconnected at a specified
voltage level can all be considered to predict dynamic stability under a cyberattack or wide-area physical attack. System topology and the criticality of each
individual station also greatly affect frequency and voltage stability.
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Figure 4.31. Tripping multiple areas

Table 4.12. Frequency response of tripping 1 level from largest generator in Zones 5 and 21

Contingency Frequency Response
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Total
Load
Tripped

Total
Generation
Tripped

0 MW

4153 MW

Table 4.13. Frequency response of tripping 2 levels from largest generator in Zones 5 and 21

Contingency Frequency Response

Total
Load
Tripped

Total
Generation
Tripped

330 MW

4789 MW

Table 4.14. Frequency response of tripping 3 levels from largest generator in Zones 5 and 21

Contingency Frequency Response
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Total
Load
Tripped

Total
Generation
Tripped

591 MW

5821 MW

Figure 4.32. Google Earth image of entire Atlantis 9000 system buses (yellow) and buses tripped
in Stage 2 (red) from tripping largest generators in Zones 5 and 21
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Patterns can be drawn from the analyzed scenarios. For example, in the radial
area studies, boundaries can be determined by studying the amount and location
of load and generation tripped in the final stage before divergence and the stage
when divergence occurs. In general for the radial area attacks, less than 1% of
the system’s total generation or total load was tripped before divergence
occurred.
Though individual zones have differing generation and load amounts that can be
tripped before diverging, the ratio of total load to generation lost in the zone, and
within the entire system, could be further analyzed to observe more conclusions
from the results. When tripping the largest generation facilities in a zone, the
percentage of generation disconnected in the zone varied greatly depending on
the area selected. Generally, the ratio of generation tripped to total system
generation was typically below 10%.
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5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE
WORK
Security assessment through dynamic stability analysis was performed on three
power systems using three different methods. In the MIDAS project, dynamic
stability criteria was determined by generating power flow, dynamic, and
contingency data to serve as input to a machine learning tool. The dynamic
effects of tripping main generation facilities, loads, transmission lines, and
substations were simulated on the developed Puerto Rico 2018 transmission
system. Additionally, models with high PV integration were created to study the
dynamic effects under a generation trip. Lastly, dynamic simulations were
conducted to investigate impacts of hackers shutting down multiple generators,
loads, or other substations within an electrical utility and determining what
scenarios would lead to system collapse.

Dynamic Security Assessment (DSA) for Multi-Timescale
Integrated Dynamics and Scheduling for Solar (MIDAS)
Future Work
In the next phase of the MIDAS project, a larger model, the Western Electricity
Coordinating Council (WECC) system, will be used to create cases for the
machine learning tool. Test creation for this system should be more
straightforward because the approach for case development for each stability
method has already been determined, and Python scripts to automate tasks in
PSS®E have already been written. Additionally, system power flow information
will be provided for a longer period than 24 hours to better analyze stability
changes due to seasonal effects, weather, load consumption, or other causes.
As test cases are regenerated for the WECC system, improvements can be
made to the test generation scripts to include more complex scenarios. For
example, aside from just inertia, governor status combinations could also be
incorporated into frequency stability analysis. Because inertia is not usually
perfectly linear with generation level, other inputs may need to be provided into
the machine learning model, given that a specified generation output could have
multiple total system inertia values. Similar to what was done with the 23-bus
system, steady-state cases could also incorporate events such as generator
maintenance and probability of transmission line outages.
Lastly, the effects of increased solar penetration will be included in the model.
The ability of the machine learning algorithm to accurately predict frequency,
transient, and small-signal stability margin will be assessed with a higher amount
of PV in the system.
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Assessing Security During Natural Disasters and Increased
Renewable Penetration in Puerto Rico Future Work
Since the UTK 2018 PREPA transmission model was created and initial PREPAdeveloped models were provided for study, updated 2019 cases have been
created by PREPA. Using these updated models, which may more accurately
represent the system following the hurricane, corridor trip simulations and high
PV studies, along with other contingency simulations, can be done. During the
time this thesis was written, an additional solar penetration study was performed
on the PREPA 2019 day-peak model, and results are included in the Appendix in
Section A.3. In the Phase II effort, the ORNL/PREPA team will continue to deploy
UGAs based on the locations outlined in Section 3.2. Additionally, a new project
was started in October 2018 to develop and deploy a phasor data concentrator
for PREPA to collect the streaming data from all UGA units in PREPA system.
The data analytics effort will start as more data becomes available. Using this
data, the UTK-developed 2018 model and PREPA-developed models can be
validated.

Assessing Security During Cyber-Attacks and Wide-Area
Physical Attacks on Bulk Electric System Assets Future
Work
The scenarios studied are not exhaustive or comprehensive. Future work could
be done to go through more permutations of possible attacks. Additionally, other
dynamic characteristics, such as transient stability could be studied. The same
scenarios could also be analyzed while varying the time that each bus is
disconnected instead of disconnecting multiple buses or machines at once.
Systems of various sizes and topologies could also be assessed. For example, in
a smaller system, less generation or load could be lost to cause system collapse,
as compared to a larger system.
Lastly, a combination of system power flow data, along with dynamic response,
could be used to predict the possible effects of tripping combinations of
substations and other equipment. For example, [50] describes how hypothesized
outage combinations can first go through steady-state simulation screening and
then dynamic simulation verification to predict whether the contingency will cause
a cascading outage.
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A.1 Python and MATLAB Scripts Used to Generate Test
Cases in Machine Learning Project
A.1.1 Python Scripts for 23-Bus System
A.1.1.1 Steady-State Saved Case Generation
#This script creates steady-state PSS/E saved cases for the 23-bus example system (savnw).
#Load data for each zone is based off of balancing authority data, and values are scaled to fit the 23-bus
system.
#Line outages are scheduled based on probability, and generators are scheduled for maintenance during
light-load periods.
#To schedule line outages, outage probability was taken from the .prb file. A separate MATLAB script was
used to create
#the generator outage schedule.
psspy.lines_per_page_one_device(1,60)
psspy.progress_output(2,r"""Log""",[0,0])
import csv
import random
#Import load data for each zone from csv file, and scale to fit 23-bus system
datetime = [];
AESOload = [];
PACWload = [];
TEPload = [];
with open('Load_RT_hourly.csv', 'rb') as csvfile:
spamreader = csv.reader(csvfile, delimiter=',', quotechar='|')
rowCount = 1;
for row in spamreader:
if(rowCount != 1):
datetime.append(row[0]);
AESOload.append(float(row[1]));
PACWload.append(float(row[20]));
TEPload.append(float(row[33]));
rowCount = rowCount + 1;
AESOavg = sum(AESOload)/float(len(AESOload))
PACWavg = sum(PACWload)/float(len(PACWload))
TEPavg = sum(TEPload)/float(len(TEPload))
Area1Avg = 200.0-((max(AESOload)-AESOavg)/max(AESOload))*200.0
Area2Avg = 2500.0-((max(PACWload)-PACWavg)/max(PACWload))*2500.0
Area5Avg = 500.0-((max(TEPload)-TEPavg)/max(TEPload))*500.0
AESOdev = [];
PACWdev = [];
TEPdev = [];
for i in range(len(datetime)):
AESOdev.append((AESOload[i] - AESOavg)/AESOavg)
PACWdev.append((PACWload[i] - PACWavg)/PACWavg)
TEPdev.append((TEPload[i] - TEPavg)/TEPavg)
#Schedule out-of-service machines
f = open("machineOutages.py", "w")
generatorMaintenance = [[3011,2037],[206,6593],[101,1052],[102,2709],[211,3400],[3018,350]]
generatorMaintenanceSchedule = []
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startingHour = 0
for j in range(len(generatorMaintenance)):
for i in range(len(datetime)):
if((i+1) == generatorMaintenance[j][1]):
startingHour = i
machStatus = 0
elif(i <= (startingHour+671) and startingHour != 0):
machStatus = 0
else:
machStatus = 1
startingHour = 0
generatorMaintenanceSchedule.append([generatorMaintenance[j][0],(i+1),machStatus])
f.write(str(generatorMaintenanceSchedule))
#Schedule out-of-service branches using probability
reactance138kV = 0.762
reactance230kV = 0.746
reactance500kV = 0.746
fmt138kV = 0.1
fmt230kV = 0.1
fmt500kV = 0.1
ft138kV = 0.1
ft230kV = 0.1
ft500kV = 0.1
dt138kV = 10
dt230kV = 10
dt500kV = 10
dmt138kV = 7
dmt230kV = 10
dmt500kV = 10
fromBuses = psspy.abrnint(-1,1,1,1,1,'FROMNUMBER')[1][0]
toBuses = psspy.abrnint(-1,1,1,1,1,'TONUMBER')[1][0]
IDs = []
reactances = []
lengths = []
frequencies = []
durations = []
failureTimes = []
for i in range(len(fromBuses)):
if((fromBuses[i] == fromBuses[i-1]) and (toBuses[i] == toBuses[i-1])):
IDs.append('2')
else:
IDs.append('1')
for i in range(len(fromBuses)):
reactances.append(psspy.brndt2(fromBuses[i],toBuses[i],IDs[i],'RX')[1].imag)
for i in range(len(fromBuses)):
if(psspy.busdat(fromBuses[i],'BASE')[1] == 138):
length = reactances[i]/reactance138kV
lengths.append(length)
elif(psspy.busdat(fromBuses[i],'BASE')[1] == 230):
length = reactances[i]/reactance230kV

126

lengths.append(length)
elif(psspy.busdat(fromBuses[i],'BASE')[1] == 500):
length = reactances[i]/reactance500kV
lengths.append(length)
for i in range(len(fromBuses)):
if(psspy.busdat(fromBuses[i],'BASE')[1] == 138):
frequency = lengths[i]*fmt138kV+ft138kV
duration = (fmt138kV*dmt138kV*lengths[i]+ft138kV*dt138kV)/frequency
failureTime = (frequency*duration)/9528/10
elif(psspy.busdat(fromBuses[i],'BASE')[1] == 230):
frequency = lengths[i]*fmt230kV+ft230kV
duration = (fmt230kV*dmt230kV*lengths[i]+ft230kV*dt230kV)/frequency
failureTime = (frequency*duration)/9528/10
elif(psspy.busdat(fromBuses[i],'BASE')[1] == 500):
frequency = lengths[i]*fmt500kV+ft500kV
duration = (fmt500kV*dmt500kV*lengths[i]+ft500kV*dt500kV)/frequency
failureTime = (frequency*duration)/9528/10
frequencies.append(frequency)
durations.append(duration)
failureTimes.append(failureTime)
HourlyStatus = []
f = open("lineOutages.py", "w")
outageStart = 0
status = 1
for j in range(len(fromBuses)):
for i in range(len(datetime)):
randomNumber = random.uniform(0,1)
if(randomNumber <= failureTimes[j]):
status = 0
outageStart = 1
elif((i+j) >= 1 and HourlyStatus[i-1+(j*len(datetime))][3] == 1 and HourlyStatus[i-1+(j*len(datetime))][0]
== [fromBuses[j],toBuses[j],IDs[j]]):
status = 0
outageStart = 0
elif((i+j) >= 2 and HourlyStatus[i-2+(j*len(datetime))][3] == 1 and HourlyStatus[i-2+(j*len(datetime))][0]
== [fromBuses[j],toBuses[j],IDs[j]]):
status = 0
outageStart = 0
elif((i+j) >= 3 and HourlyStatus[i-3+(j*len(datetime))][3] == 1 and HourlyStatus[i-3+(j*len(datetime))][0]
== [fromBuses[j],toBuses[j],IDs[j]]):
status = 0
outageStart = 0
elif((i+j) >= 4 and HourlyStatus[i-4+(j*len(datetime))][3] == 1 and HourlyStatus[i-4+(j*len(datetime))][0]
== [fromBuses[j],toBuses[j],IDs[j]]):
status = 0
outageStart = 0
elif((i+j) >= 5 and HourlyStatus[i-5+(j*len(datetime))][3] == 1 and HourlyStatus[i-5+(j*len(datetime))][0]
== [fromBuses[j],toBuses[j],IDs[j]]):
status = 0
outageStart = 0
elif((i+j) >= 6 and HourlyStatus[i-6+(j*len(datetime))][3] == 1 and HourlyStatus[i-6+(j*len(datetime))][0]
== [fromBuses[j],toBuses[j],IDs[j]]):
status = 0
outageStart = 0
elif((i+j) >= 7 and HourlyStatus[i-7+(j*len(datetime))][3] == 1 and HourlyStatus[i-7+(j*len(datetime))][0]
== [fromBuses[j],toBuses[j],IDs[j]]):

127

status = 0
outageStart = 0
elif((i+j) >= 8 and HourlyStatus[i-8+(j*len(datetime))][3] == 1 and HourlyStatus[i-8+(j*len(datetime))][0]
== [fromBuses[j],toBuses[j],IDs[j]]):
status = 0
outageStart = 0
elif((i+j) >= 9 and HourlyStatus[i-9+(j*len(datetime))][3] == 1 and HourlyStatus[i-9+(j*len(datetime))][0]
== [fromBuses[j],toBuses[j],IDs[j]]):
status = 0
outageStart = 0
else:
status = 1
outageStart = 0
hour = i+1
HourlyStatus.append([[fromBuses[j],toBuses[j],IDs[j]],hour,status,outageStart])
f.write(str(HourlyStatus))
#For each time step, scale loads, set machines and branches in and out of service, perform economic
dispatch, perform power flow, and create saved case file
for k in rangelen(datetime)):
psspy.case(r"""savnw.sav""")
#Scale loads
psspy.bsys(0,0,[ 13.8, 500.],1,[1],0,[],0,[],0,[])
psspy.scal_2(0,0,1,[0,0,0,0,0],[0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0])
psspy.scal_2(0,1,2,[_i,1,0,1,0],[ (1+PACWdev[k])*Area1Avg, 1500.0,0.0,-600.0, 300.0,-.0, 100.0])
psspy.bsys(0,0,[ 13.8, 500.],1,[2],0,[],0,[],0,[])
psspy.scal_2(0,0,1,[0,0,0,0,0],[0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0])
psspy.scal_2(0,1,2,[_i,1,0,1,0],[ (1+AESOdev[k])*Area2Avg, 1400.0,0.0,-.0, 650.0,-.0, 1650.0])
psspy.bsys(0,0,[ 13.8, 500.],1,[5],0,[],0,[],0,[])
psspy.scal_2(0,0,1,[0,0,0,0,0],[0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0])
psspy.scal_2(0,1,2,[_i,1,0,1,0],[ (1+TEPdev[k])*Area5Avg, 358.66,0.0,-.0,0.0,-.0, 200.0])
#Set machines in and out of services
for i in range(len(generatorMaintenanceSchedule)):
if(generatorMaintenanceSchedule[i][1] == (k+1)):
machine = generatorMaintenanceSchedule[i][0]
mStatus = generatorMaintenanceSchedule[i][2]
psspy.machine_chng_2(machine,r"""1""",[mStatus,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f])

#Set branches in and out of service
for i in range(len(HourlyStatus)):
if(HourlyStatus[i][1] == (k+1)):
fromBus = HourlyStatus[i][0][0]
toBus = HourlyStatus[i][0][1]
ID = HourlyStatus[i][0][2]
branchStatus = HourlyStatus[i][2]

psspy.branch_chng(fromBus,toBus,ID,[branchStatus,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f])

##Perform economic dispatch
totalLoad = (1+PACWdev[k])*Area1Avg + (1+AESOdev[k])*Area2Avg + (1+TEPdev[k])*Area5Avg
psspy.ecdi(0,1,1,r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\EXAMPLE PSSE System Changing Power Flow\EXAMPLE\savnw.ecd""",0,[ 0.0,0.0])
psspy.ecdi(0,1,2,r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\EXAMPLE PSSE System Changing Power Flow\EXAMPLE\savnw.ecd""",0,[ 0.0,0.0])
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psspy.ecdi(0,1,3,r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\EXAMPLE PSSE System Changing Power Flow\EXAMPLE\savnw.ecd""",0,[ totalLoad,0.0])
psspy.ecdi(0,1,4,r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\EXAMPLE PSSE System Changing Power Flow\EXAMPLE\savnw.ecd""",0,[ 0.0,0.0])
##perform OPF
psspy.nopf(0,1)
## solve power flow without Var limit
psspy.fdns([0,0,0,1,1,0,-1,0])
#psspy.save(r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\EXAMPLE PSSE System Changing Power Flow\EXAMPLE\GeneratedCases\savnw_""" + """Hour_""" + str(k+1) + """.sav""")
##Solve power flow
# psspy.fdns([0,0,0,1,1,0,99,0])
#Check for convergence
ival = psspy.solved()
if(ival == 0):
psspy.save(r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\EXAMPLE PSSE System Changing Power Flow\EXAMPLE\GeneratedCases\savnw_""" + """Hour_""" + str(k+1) + """.sav""")
else:
psspy.save(r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\EXAMPLE PSSE System Changing Power Flow\EXAMPLE\UnconvergedGeneratedCases\savnw_""" + """Hour_""" + str(k+1) +
""".sav""")

A.1.2 Python Scripts for 18-Bus System
A.1.2.1 Steady-State Saved Case Generation
#This script creates the saved cases for different generator outputs and load values at each time step in the
Input_24hr_PV_GEN.csv file for the 18-bus systems.
#Currently only 5-minute data is used, even though the csv file has data for every 4 seconds.
import csv
#Import generation data
time_GEN = []
NORTH_G1 = []
WEST_G1 = []
SOUTH_G1 = []
EAST_G1 = []
EAST_PV = []
with open('Input_24hr_PV_GEN.csv', 'rb') as csvfile:
spamreader = csv.reader(csvfile, delimiter=',', quotechar='|')
rowCount = 0
for row in spamreader:
#Only get data every 5 minutes
if(rowCount != 0 and (rowCount == 1 or ((rowCount-1)%75 == 0))):
time_GEN.append(float(row[0]))
NORTH_G1.append(float(row[1]))
WEST_G1.append(float(row[2]))
SOUTH_G1.append(float(row[3]))
EAST_G1.append(float(row[4]))
EAST_PV.append(float(row[5]))
rowCount = rowCount + 1
#Import load data
time_LOADS = []
NORTH_02 = []
NORTH_03 = []
WEST_02 = []
WEST_03 = []
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SOUTH_01_1 = []
SOUTH_01_2 = []
SOUTH_03 = []
EAST_01 = []
with open('Input_24hr_PV_LOADS.csv', 'rb') as csvfile:
spamreader = csv.reader(csvfile, delimiter=',', quotechar='|')
rowCount = 0
for row in spamreader:
#Only get data every 5 minutes
if(rowCount != 0 and (rowCount == 1 or ((rowCount-1)%75 == 0))):
time_LOADS.append(float(row[0]))
NORTH_02.append(float(row[1]))
NORTH_03.append(float(row[2]))
WEST_02.append(float(row[3]))
WEST_03.append(float(row[4]))
SOUTH_01_1.append(float(row[5]))
SOUTH_01_2.append(float(row[6]))
SOUTH_03.append(float(row[7]))
EAST_01.append(float(row[8]))
rowCount = rowCount + 1
#Based on base case PGen of NORTH_G1
NORTH_G1_H1_PERCENT = 159.6729/(159.6729 + 141.5969)
NORTH_G1_H2_PERCENT = 1 - NORTH_G1_H1_PERCENT
for i in range(12*24):
#Load base case
psspy.case(r"""t3ps_v33_PV_time_00_00_bus111_2mach.sav""")
#Set generation
psspy.machine_chng_2(101,r"""H1""",[_i,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[
NORTH_G1[i]*NORTH_G1_H1_PERCENT,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f])
NORTH_G1_H2 = NORTH_G1[i] - (NORTH_G1[i]*NORTH_G1_H1_PERCENT)
print NORTH_G1[i]*NORTH_G1_H1_PERCENT
psspy.machine_chng_2(101,r"""H2""",[_i,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[
NORTH_G1_H2,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f])
WEST_G1[i] = WEST_G1[i] - 70.0
psspy.machine_chng_2(111,r"""1""",[_i,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[
WEST_G1[i],_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f])
psspy.machine_chng_2(231,r"""1""",[_i,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[
SOUTH_G1[i],_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f])
psspy.machine_chng_2(311,r"""1""",[_i,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[
EAST_G1[i],_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f])
psspy.machine_chng_2(312,r"""PV""",[_i,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[
EAST_PV[i],_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f])
#Set loads
psspy.load_chng_4(2,r"""1""",[_i,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[ NORTH_02[i],_f,_f,_f,_f,_f])
psspy.load_chng_4(3,r"""1""",[_i,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[ NORTH_03[i],_f,_f,_f,_f,_f])
psspy.load_chng_4(12,r"""1""",[_i,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[ WEST_02[i],_f,_f,_f,_f,_f])
psspy.load_chng_4(13,r"""1""",[_i,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[ WEST_03[i],_f,_f,_f,_f,_f])
psspy.load_chng_4(21,r"""1""",[_i,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[ SOUTH_01_1[i],_f,_f,_f,_f,_f])
psspy.load_chng_4(21,r"""2""",[_i,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[ SOUTH_01_2[i],_f,_f,_f,_f,_f])
psspy.load_chng_4(23,r"""1""",[_i,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[ SOUTH_03[i],_f,_f,_f,_f,_f])
psspy.load_chng_4(31,r"""1""",[_i,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[ EAST_01[i],_f,_f,_f,_f,_f])
hour = i/12
minutes = (i - (hour*12))*5
#Solve power flow
psspy.fdns([0,0,0,1,1,0,99,0])
#Check for convergence and save to file
ival = psspy.solved()
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if(ival == 0):
psspy.save(r"""Generated Cases\t3ps_v33_PV_hour_""" + str(hour+1) + """_min_""" + str(minutes) +
"""_bus111_2mach.sav""")
else:
psspy.save(r"""UnconvergedGeneratedCases\t3ps_v33_PV_hour_""" + str(hour+1) + """_min_""" +
str(minutes) + """_bus111_2mach.sav""")

A.1.2.2 Frequency Stability Assessment Dynamic File Generation
# This script creates individual dynamic files for each time step, based on input from the
Input_24hr_PV_GEN_7Mach.csv file for the 18-bus system.
# This file was created using the generator outputs from the previously generated saved cases for each time
step.
# Inertia is scaled linearly with generation output.
import csv
#Import generation data
time_GEN = []
total_GEN = []
with open('Input_24hr_PV_GEN_7Mach.csv', 'rb') as csvfile:
spamreader = csv.reader(csvfile, delimiter=',', quotechar='|')
rowCount = 0
for row in spamreader:
#Only get data every 5 minutes
if(rowCount != 0):
time_GEN.append(float(row[0]))
total_GEN.append(float(row[9]))
rowCount = rowCount + 1
max_GEN = max(total_GEN)
min_GEN = min(total_GEN)
Sid=-1 # All machines
Flag=1 # Only in-service machines at in-service plants
ierr, Nmach = psspy.amachcount(Sid, Flag)
# get no of machines in the subsystem
ierr, iMbus = psspy.amachint(Sid, Flag, 'NUMBER') # get machine bus numbers
ierr, cMids = psspy.amachchar(Sid, Flag, 'ID') # get machine IDs
iMbus=iMbus[0]
cMids=cMids[0]
H=[]
D=[]
MBASE=[]
P=[]
Q=[]
psspy.dyre_new([1,1,1,1],r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\18 Bus System from
NREL\t3ps_PV_bus312_db1_bus111_2mach.dyr""","","","")
#Get base inertia and machine parameters
for iM in range(0,(Nmach-1)): # iterate through the list of machines except for PV machine
ibus = iMbus[iM]
genId = cMids[iM]
ierr,busN = psspy.notona(ibus) # return the bus 18-character extended bus name for a specified bus
number
iH = 0 # resetting the intertia value index
iD = 0 # resetting the speed damping value index
ierr, icon0 = psspy.mdlind(ibus, genId, 'GEN', 'CON') # get initial CON address (index)
ierr, genMdl = psspy.mdlnam(ibus, genId, 'GEN') # get generator model name
print genMdl
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genMdl = genMdl.strip()
# remove blanks
# Find absolute index iH in CONS array using relative CON index in the generator model and
# previously found starting CON index of the generator model
# (here shown only for the three most common models)
if genMdl=='GENCLS': iH=icon0
if (genMdl=='GENSAL')|(genMdl=='GENSAE'): iH=icon0+3
if (genMdl=='GENROU')|(genMdl=='GENROE'): iH=icon0+4
# Find absolute index iD in CONS array using relative CON index in the generator model and
# previously found starting CON index of the generator model
# (here shown only for the three most common models)
if genMdl=='GENCLS': iD=icon0+1
if (genMdl=='GENSAL')|(genMdl=='GENSAE'): iD=icon0+4
if (genMdl=='GENROU')|(genMdl=='GENROE'): iD=icon0+5
# Get value from CONS array corresponding to the generator inertia
H.append(psspy.dsrval('CON', iH)[1])
D.append(psspy.dsrval('CON', iD)[1])
# Get MBASE value
MBASE.append(psspy.macdat(ibus, genId, 'MBASE')[1])
P.append(psspy.macdat(ibus, genId, 'P')[1])
Q.append(psspy.macdat(ibus, genId, 'Q')[1])
#Change intertia of each machine based on total generation at each time step
slope = (1-0.2)/(max_GEN-min_GEN)
intercept = 1-(max_GEN*slope)
inertiaScaleFactor = 1
inertias = []
for i in range(12*24):
#Load base dynamic case each time so all inertia levels are set to base value
psspy.dyre_new([1,1,1,1],r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\18 Bus System from
NREL\t3ps_PV_bus312_db1_bus111_2mach.dyr""","","","")
# Linear equation was derived by using (0.2, min total gen over 24-hour period) and (1, max total gen over
24-hour period)
# Throughout the 24-hour period inertia is scaled between 0.2-1 times the base inertia value
inertiaScaleFactor = slope*total_GEN[i]+intercept
for iM in range(0,(Nmach-1)):
print "------------------------------"
print H[iM]
# flag = 1
ibus = iMbus[iM]
genId = cMids[iM]
ierr,busN = psspy.notona(ibus) # return the bus 18-character extended bus name for a specified bus
number
iH = 0 # resetting the intertia value index
iD = 0 # resetting the speed damping value index
ierr, icon0 = psspy.mdlind(ibus, genId, 'GEN', 'CON') # get initial CON address (index)
ierr, genMdl = psspy.mdlnam(ibus, genId, 'GEN') # get generator model name
print genMdl
genMdl = genMdl.strip()
# remove blanks
# Find absolute index iH in CONS array using relative CON index in the generator model and
# previously found starting CON index of the generator model
# (here shown only for the three most common models)
if genMdl=='GENCLS': iH=icon0
if (genMdl=='GENSAL')|(genMdl=='GENSAE'): iH=icon0+3
if (genMdl=='GENROU')|(genMdl=='GENROE'): iH=icon0+4
# Find absolute index iD in CONS array using relative CON index in the generator model and
# previously found starting CON index of the generator model
# (here shown only for the three most common models)
if genMdl=='GENCLS': iD=icon0+1
if (genMdl=='GENSAL')|(genMdl=='GENSAE'): iD=icon0+4
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if (genMdl=='GENROU')|(genMdl=='GENROE'): iD=icon0+5
# Check the generator output
if ((P[iM]<999999999)&(P[iM]>-999999999))&((Q[iM]<999999999)&(Q[iM]>-999999999)):
print '***A zero output generator is found.***'
print(ibus)
print(genId)
if genMdl=='GENCLS':
ibus
genId
ierr = psspy.change_con(iH, H[iM]*inertiaScaleFactor)
print(ibus)
print(genId)
print(iH)
print(H[iM]/10)
print '***
End
***'
if (genMdl=='GENSAL')|(genMdl=='GENSAE'):
ibus
genId
ierr = psspy.change_con(iH, H[iM]*inertiaScaleFactor)
print(ibus)
print(genId)
print(iH)
print(H[iM]/10)
print '***
End
***'
if (genMdl=='GENROU')|(genMdl=='GENROE'):
ibus
genId
ierr = psspy.change_con(iH, H[iM]*inertiaScaleFactor)
print(ibus)
print(genId)
print(iH)
print(H[iM]/10)
print '***
End
***'
hour = i/12
minutes = (i - (hour*12))*5
psspy.dyda(0,1,[2,1,1],0,r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\18 Bus System from
NREL\Frequency Stability\Dynamic Cases\t3ps_PV_bus312_db1_hour_""" + str(hour+1) + """_min_""" +
str(minutes) + """_bus111_2mach.dyr""")
inertias.append(inertiaScaleFactor)
print inertias

A.1.2.3 Frequency Stability Assessment Generation Trip Batch Simulations
# This script takes each converted saved case file and dynamic file (with scaled inertia) at each time period.
# A generation trip is performed at each time step, with the same amount of generation (70 MW) tripped
each time.
#Load base cases
ierr = psspy.case("""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\18 Bus System from
NREL\t3ps_v33_PV_time_00_00_bus111_2mach.sav""")
psspy.dyre_new([1,1,1,1],r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\18 Bus System from
NREL\t3ps_PV_bus312_db1_bus111_2mach.dyr""","","","")

# Generator Bus Number - MachBus
ierr, MachBus = psspy.amachint(-1, 1, 'NUMBER')
# Generator ID - MachID
ierr2, MachID = psspy.amachchar(-1, 1, 'ID')
psspy.dynamics_solution_param_2([50,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f, 0.004,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f])
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psspy.bsys(0,0,[ 0.12, 999.],0,[],len(MachBus[0]),MachBus[0],0,[],0,[])
#Monitor machine speed deviation
psspy.chsb(0,0,[-1,-1,-1,1,7,0]);
psspy.set_chnfil_type(0)
#Convert loads and generators in saved cases
for i in range(12*24):
hour = i/12
minutes = (i - (hour*12))*5
#Load saved case for each time
ierr = psspy.case(r"""t3ps_v33_PV_hour_"""+str(hour+1)+"""_min_"""
+str(minutes)+"""_bus111_2mach.sav""")
psspy.cong(0)
psspy.conl(0,1,1,[0,0],[0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0])
psspy.conl(0,1,2,[0,0],[0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0])
psspy.conl(0,1,3,[0,0],[0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0])
psspy.save(r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\18 Bus System from
NREL\Converted Saved Case
Files\t3ps_v33_PV_hour_"""+str(hour+1)+"""_min_"""+str(minutes)+"""_bus111_2mach_conv.sav""")
#Trip generation for each case at each time step
for i in range(12*24):
hour = i/12
minutes = (i - (hour*12))*5
#Load converted file
ierr = psspy.case(r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\18 Bus System from
NREL\Converted Saved Case
Files\t3ps_v33_PV_hour_"""+str(hour+1)+"""_min_"""+str(minutes)+"""_bus111_2mach_conv.sav""")
#Load dynamic file
psspy.dyre_new([1,1,1,1],r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\18 Bus System from
NREL\Frequency Stability\Dynamic Cases\t3ps_PV_bus312_db1_hour_""" + str(hour+1) + """_min_""" +
str(minutes) + """_bus111_2mach.dyr""","","","")
if((hour+1) < 10):
if(minutes < 10):
psspy.strt(1,r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\18 Bus System from
NREL\Frequency Stability\Output Files\t3ps_v33_PV_hour_0""" + str(hour+1) + """_min_0""" + str(minutes)
+"""_bus111_2mach_Trip70MW.out""")
else:
psspy.strt(1,r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\18 Bus System from
NREL\Frequency Stability\Output Files\t3ps_v33_PV_hour_0""" + str(hour+1) + """_min_""" + str(minutes)
+"""_bus111_2mach_Trip70MW.out""")
else:
if(minutes < 10):
psspy.strt(1,r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\18 Bus System from
NREL\Frequency Stability\Output Files\t3ps_v33_PV_hour_""" + str(hour+1) + """_min_0""" + str(minutes)
+"""_bus111_2mach_Trip70MW.out""")
else:
psspy.strt(1,r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\18 Bus System from
NREL\Frequency Stability\Output Files\t3ps_v33_PV_hour_""" + str(hour+1) + """_min_""" + str(minutes)
+"""_bus111_2mach_Trip70MW.out""")
psspy.run(0,1,0,1,1)
#Trip 70 MW of generation
psspy.dist_machine_trip(111,'2')
psspy.run(0, 20.0,0,1,1)
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A.1.2.4 Transient Stability Assessment 3-Phase Fault Batch Simulations
# This script loads each converted saved case file at each time period and the base dynamic file.
# A 3-phase fault is performed on the same branch at each time step. Clearing times are adjusted, and
results are saved to individual files.
#Load base cases
ierr = psspy.case("""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\18 Bus System from
NREL\Transient Stability\t3ps_v33_PV_hour_1_min_0_bus111_2mach.sav""")
psspy.dyre_new([1,1,1,1],r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\18 Bus System from
NREL\Transient Stability\t3ps_PV_bus312_db1_bus111_2mach.dyr""","","","")

# Generator Bus Number - MachBus
ierr, MachBus = psspy.amachint(-1, 1, 'NUMBER')
# Generator ID - MachID
ierr2, MachID = psspy.amachchar(-1, 1, 'ID')
psspy.dynamics_solution_param_2([50,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f, 0.004,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f])
psspy.bsys(0,0,[ 0.12, 999.],0,[],len(MachBus[0]),MachBus[0],0,[],0,[])
#Monitor machine rotor angle
psspy.chsb(0,0,[-1,-1,-1,1,1,0]);
psspy.set_chnfil_type(0)
clearingTimes =
[0.096,0.098,0.100,0.120,0.140,0.160,0.180,0.200,0.220,0.240,0.260,0.280,0.300,0.320,0.340,0.360,0.380,
0.400,00.420,0.440,0.460,0.480,0.500,0.520,0.540,0.560,0.580,0.600,0.620,0.640,0.660,0.680,0.700]
for i in range(12*24):
hour = i/12
minutes = (i - (hour*12))*5
#Load converted file
ierr = psspy.case(r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\18 Bus System from
NREL\Transient
Stability\t3ps_v33_PV_hour_"""+str(hour+1)+"""_min_"""+str(minutes)+"""_bus111_2mach_conv.sav""")
#Load dynamic file
psspy.dyre_new([1,1,1,1],r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\18 Bus System from
NREL\Transient Stability\t3ps_PV_bus312_db1_bus111_2mach.dyr""","","","")
for j in range(len(clearingTimes)):
clearingTimeName = str(clearingTimes[j])
if(clearingTimes[j] == 0.5 or clearingTimes[j] == 0.6 or clearingTimes[j] == 0.7):
clearingTimeName = clearingTimeName + '00'
else:
clearingTimeName = clearingTimeName + '0'
if((hour+1) < 10):
if(minutes < 10):
psspy.strt(1,r"""t3ps_v33_PV_hour_0""" + str(hour+1) + """_min_0""" + str(minutes)
+"""_bus111_2mach_Fault_CT_0_""" +clearingTimeName[2:5]+""".out""")
else:
psspy.strt(1,r"""t3ps_v33_PV_hour_0""" + str(hour+1) + """_min_""" + str(minutes)
+"""_bus111_2mach_Fault_CT_0_""" +clearingTimeName[2:5]+""".out""")
else:
if(minutes < 10):
psspy.strt(1,r"""t3ps_v33_PV_hour_""" + str(hour+1) + """_min_0""" + str(minutes)
+"""_bus111_2mach_Fault_CT_0_""" +clearingTimeName[2:5]+""".out""")
else:
psspy.strt(1,r"""t3ps_v33_PV_hour_""" + str(hour+1) + """_min_""" + str(minutes)
+"""_bus111_2mach_Fault_CT_0_""" +clearingTimeName[2:5]+""".out""")
psspy.run(0,1,0,1,1)
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#Apply 3-phase fault
psspy.dist_branch_fault(21,32,'1',1,0.0,[0.0,-2.0E11]) # apply fault
psspy.run(1,1+clearingTimes[j],0,1,1)
psspy.dist_clear_fault(1) # clear fault after specified clearing time
psspy.run(0, 20.0,0,1,1)

A.2 Power Plant and Machine Modeling Consideration for
PREPA Transmission Model
In the developed base case model, each generation plant was modeled as a
separate machine with its rated real power output set as each plant’s capacity.
For example, the Aguirre Power Complex has a gas turbine plant, steam turbine
plant, and a combined cycle plant. The three plants were modeled as three
individual machines connected to one bus. The same process was followed for
the Costa Sur steam and turbine plants and the San Juan steam and combined
cycle plants, with two machines at each location connected to a single bus. Palo
Seco also has two machines at a single bus, one steam and the other
combustion-turbine. All other plants were modeled as a single machine
connected to a single bus. (If necessary for specific studies, further modifications
could be made to show individual units at each plant and their capacities.)

A.3 Development of High PV Models of PREPA System
Using 2019 Day-Peak Model
The PREPA 2019 day-peak model, provided by DOE, contains 1,237 buses,
including transmission and distribution levels. In this model, there are 133 total
machines, with 62 of the machines online.
The purpose of the study was to analyze system dynamic frequency response,
after a set contingency, when non-renewable machines in the system are
replaced with solar. First, generator models for each machine specified in the
dynamics (.dyr) file, were used to determine whether or not a machine was
renewable or non-renewable. During this study, the real power output of online
machines was used to calculate the percentage of renewable machine output to
total generation output. The total real power output of all online machines is
approximately 2,698.43 MW, and the total capacity of online machines is
13,973.46 MW. In the base case, the percentage of renewable machine output to
total online generation was calculated to be approximately 15%, with the real
power output of renewable machines totaling 408.19 MW. At each penetration
level studied including the base case, a machine at San Juan Steam Plant,
outputting 80 MW, was tripped. In each scenario, the speed deviation of all
machines in the system was monitored and converted to frequency. The
frequency response of tripping 80 MW in the base case, is shown in Figure A.1.
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Figure A.1. Frequency response of tripping 80 MW of generation in 15% renewable case
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Simulations of this contingency were also performed at the 30%, 50%, 70%,
80%, and 90% renewable penetration levels. Table A.1 contains the online nonrenewable machines, including their bus number, bus name, ID, and real power
output. To obtain certain levels of renewable penetration, combinations of
machines listed in Table A.1 were replaced with solar machines. To do this, the
machine’s generator model, governor model, and exciter models were deleted in
the dynamic file. The generator model was then replaced with the GEPVG
model, and the exciter model was replaced with the GEPVE model. The
parameters for the GEPVG model are included in Table 3.9. The PRATE
parameter, or rated power the generator, varied depending on the capacity of the
individual machine. Typical parameters for the GEPVE model are included in
Table 3.10.
The renewable penetration levels studied include 30%, 50%, 70%, 80%, and
90% of online renewable machine output to system total generation output. After
the dynamic models of the substituted machines were modified for each
penetration case, dynamic simulations were performed. For each penetration
level, the system frequency response while tripping 80 MW of generation is
plotted (Figure A.2- Figure A.8). As solar penetration increases, the frequency
nadir, or minimum post-contingency frequency, decreases, and it takes the
system frequency a longer time to settle.
Once the renewable penetration level reached 80%, the UFLT relays in the
system began to actuate. Further explanation about the UFLT relay settings and
operation is provided in Section 3.1.4. With line relays included in the model for
the 80% renewable case, the frequency sharply increases after reaching
approximately 58.5 Hz, rises to about 60.3 Hz, and then begins to decrease and
settle. The rise in frequency above 60 Hz is due to several load buses islanded,
as a result of under-frequency line trips, without any in-service machines. Without
line relays in the model, the frequency response is smoother and more closely
follows the shape of the 70% case but with lower frequency nadir.
Line relays also trip in the 90% renewable case. Comparing Figure A.7 to Figure
A.5, the frequency initially dropped at a faster rate than the 80% case. Frequency
also increased at a faster rate after reaching a frequency nadir of about 58.5 Hz.
When removing line relays, the frequency of the 90% case continued to drop.
This is because several machines dropped off of the system due to their underfrequency protection trip settings.

138

Table A.1. Online non-renewable machines
Bus Number

Bus Name

ID

PGen (MW)

805

C.S.5

23.000

1

250

806

C.S.6

23.000

1

250

809

AG.1

24.000

1

230.5284

810

AG.2

23.000

1

230

819

P.SECO3

20.000

1

170

820

P.SECO4

20.000

1

170

871

AES 1

21.000

1

166

872

AES 2

21.000

1

166

856

SJREPG1

1

139.5

860

ECOSTEAM

1

98

858

ECOGT1

17.100

1

88

859

ECOGT2

17.100

1

88

813

SANJUAN7

13.800

1

80

814

SANJUAN8

13.800

1

80

811

SJREPST1

13.800

1

56

13.800
17.100

Figure A.2. Frequency response of tripping 80 MW of generation in 30% renewable case
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Figure A.3. Frequency response of tripping 80 MW of generation in 50% renewable case

Figure A.4. Frequency response of tripping 80 MW of generation in 70% renewable case
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Figure A.5. Frequency response of tripping 80 MW of generation in 80% renewable case

Figure A.6. Frequency response of tripping 80 MW of generation in 80% renewable case without
relays included
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Figure A.7. Frequency response of tripping 80 MW of generation in 90% renewable case

Figure A.8. Frequency response of tripping 80 MW of generation in 90% renewable case without
relays included
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A.4 How to Use the PGST Tool
This section describes how to use Dr. Pan’s PGST tool for mapping PSS®Edeveloped models. This tool involves using PSSE_Data_Interface software to
import PSS®E system data and export this data into text files the PSGT can
read.
1. Open the PSSE_Data_Interface software. A screenshot of the software
interface can be seen in Figure A.9.
2. Select the “Open raw” button, and locate your PSS®E raw file. After
the file has been opened, hit “Export.” These options are indicated in
Figure A.10. Several text files will be generated: area, branch, bus,
load transformer, and zone.
3. Open the PGST software. Click “File” -> “New” to create a new
PSSE_Interface file. Select “Bus” -> “Load” and then the “bus.txt”
document generated by the PSSE_Data_Interface software. Buses
should be clustered in a configuration similar to Figure A.11.
4. Import branch data by selecting “Branch” -> “Load” and then the
“branch.txt” file generated by the PSSE_Data_Interface software.
Branches can now be seen connecting the buses in the
PSSE_Interface file, such as the system seen in Figure A.12.
5. To load GPS data, create two text files: “bus_location.txt” and
“bus_sub.txt.” The “bus_sub.txt” file should contain all of the buses in
the system pasted into a column twice with no header. The
“bus_location.txt” file should contain the GPS coordinates, one column
for latitude and another for longitude, with coordinates given in decimal
degrees. There should be no headers in the file, and the order of the
coordinate pairs should follow the order of the buses as they are listed
in the “bus_sub.txt” file.
6. In PSGT, click “Bus” -> “Load Sub-Bus GPS” to import the
“bus_location.txt” and “bus_sub.txt” files. Once GPS data has been
added, buses should be spread out according to their location data.
The previous example with GPS coordinates included is shown in
Figure A.13.
7. The map can also be color-coded based on voltage level, area, and
zone. This can be done by going to “View” -> “Color Mode” and then
selecting one of the color level options.
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Figure A.9. PSSE_Data_Interface software user interface

Figure A.10. PSSE_Data_Interface software user interface with PSS®E raw file import buttons
highlighted
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Figure A.11. Example of PSS®E model bus data imported into PSGT software

Figure A.12. Example of PSS®E model bus and branch data imported into PSGT software
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Figure A.13. Example of PSS®E model imported into PSGT software with bus, branch, and GPS
data
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